

NAVYA - NYĀYA

Some Logical Problems
in
Historical Perspective

By

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PREFACE

Although in India philosophy and religion have always been looked upon as the two aspects of one and the same discipline, still a critical outlook takes us to a different view on the situation. It is true that our religious systems seek to stand on a firm philosophical background, but what is more true is that we have not produced intuitive and speculative philosophy alone, which sometimes verges on mysticism. A Western student of philosophy always suffers from this misunderstanding that India never produced 'true' philosophy in the modern sense of the term, or I would say, rigorous analytical or critical philosophy. He thinks that the classical Indian philosophers were concerned with primitive speculations, some occult practices, some spiritual dogmas and mysticism. Our transcendental outlook on life was to a certain extent responsible for this misconception in the West about the business and nature of Indian philosophy.

But what passes for philosophy nowadays in the West can also be found in Indian philosophic tradition and recently in the West there has been a widespread increasing interest in the study of Indian analytical philosophy. What is after all philosophy or, in other words, what sort of problems it is that philosophers are constantly engaged in solving? The answer is: To give a description of the whole universe. By this we mean not only the innumerable material objects, but also the varied acts of consciousness. We see, feel, remember, imagine and do such like. With this comes also the question of verification, that is, the rigorous analysis of human knowledge by means of logic. Such questions arise: If we can be sure that we 'know' something and whether our knowing anything corresponds to reality, whether we can generalise from observed regularity in nature, the role of words in human behaviour, i.e. to say, whether words *mean* anything. To answer these sorts of questions we enter into the realm of epistemology and logic. Philosophy nowadays is being equated with this analytical tradition.

In India while tracing the origin and development of philosophy we often find an overlap between this philosophy and religion. We believe in unquestioned absolute authority of mystical revelations, but we have also a tradition of critical pursuit for truth. The result has been that every branch of religion sought sanction from some philosophical system. But the opposite process is also discernible : a critical philosophical tradition later turned into a speculative religious system by its followers. Even in exclusively critical system of Nyāya, Pakṣilasvāmin, the author of *Nyāyabhāṣya*, transformed a pure *Vāda*-doctrine into a clear and conscious form of *adhyātma* doctrine and in doing so he drew upon the Yoga of Patañjali. But adherence to logical method implicitly runs through the mind of Pakṣilasvāmin when he tries to show that the old categories of *Vāda*-doctrine form an integral part of Nyāya, otherwise Nyāya would not have differed from other *adhyātma* doctrines, such as the Upaniṣads. Thus he interprets the term *ānvīkṣikī* in both ways : on the one hand he identifies it with Nyāya, i.e. methodology (cf. *pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam*) and on the other, he looks at it as a *adhyātma* doctrine dependent upon Nyāya, i.e. rationally worked out. This shows that in his opinion a philosophical system should neither be exclusively an assemblage of metaphysical dogmas, nor of logical or epistemological doctrines, but both these two aspects should be proportionately present. In spite of this working out of Nyāya by Pakṣilasvāmin analytical mind of the early thinkers of this tradition run into a different direction. Later on, gradually the old *adhyātma* doctrine of Nyāya receded to the background and a vigorous polemic attitude came to the forefront. It is Navya-nyāya. What I want to make out is that in Indian tradition critical attitude has never been lacking. It has always guided our philosophic speculations. In Nyāya tradition this is more discernible when the Naiyāyika says that 'whatever exists is knowable and nameable'. This serves as a blow to mysticism, because mysticism considers Ultimate Reality to be ineffable. But the fact remains that the mystics also seek sanction of his mystical experience through dialectical argumentation. The Mādhyamika dialectic of four-fold alternatives is an instance to the point. Although on the destructive side the Mādhyamika has implicitly assumed that

the nature of Reality cannot be ascertained by our dialectical reasoning and what we call Reality turns out to be empty in content, a fiction of our imagination. This method of arguments and counter-arguments has through centuries saved Indian mind from a complacent attitude and the importance of reasoning has always been admitted in spite of widespread belief in revelation and mystical experience.

Navya-nyāya is basically an epistemological and linguistic system. Analysis of statements and concepts, theory of knowledge etc. form here the subject of discussion. Although by this time Indian epistemology in Buddhist and Brahmanical circle had far advanced, still Navya-nyāya is the turning point in pioneering an altogether new method of philosophical investigation. With Udayana (eleventh Cent. A.D.) this new attitude is discernible. Udayana was mainly engaged in his defence against the Buddhist and so he had to divert his attention also to metaphysical concepts. But truly speaking, Navya-nyāya made its appearance as a rigorous system with Gaṅgeśa (14th Cent. A.D.) whose epoch-making work *Tattvacintāmaṇi* startled the intellectuals of all over the country. This work zealously displays the author's love for precision and exactitude in expression. Epistemological and logical concepts are analysed in terms of definition. This work of Gaṅgeśa gained so much popularity that the development of this school for the next six hundred years is based only on the commentaries and subcommentaries of this great work.

In Navya-nyāya traditional language in philosophy was superseded by a new set of vocabulary to keep pace with the emergence of new concepts. In course of time all branches of Sanskrit literature, viz. Grammar, Aesthetics, Law etc. adopted this new methodology and expression. Although tradition says that Navya-nyāya originated in Mithila, but recent researches have shown that Mithila and Bengal schools of Navya-nyāya were two parallel streams. Although Gaṅgeśa is said to be the pioneer exponent of Navya-nyāya but with the publication of *Nyāyaratna* of Maṇikaṇṭha and *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara, the two works belonging to pre-Gaṅgeśa period, we are now in a position to say that Gaṅgeśa was more an expert in marshalling the definitions and arguments of his predecessors.

It is worth-investigating therefore, what then was responsible for evoking such spontaneous admiration for Gaṅgeśa's *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* in the later period.

Now a few words relating to the study of Indian philosophy may be in order. A student who wishes to pursue a serious study of Indian philosophy often finds books at his disposal written in modern languages which are mainly general survey of or philosophising on the tenets of different systems, sometimes adding synopsis of the arguments and counter-arguments of different rival schools, without looking into the motive or the background which led those philosophers to argue in a particular way. In other words, individual philosophers are rarely taken into account or attempt made to judge their positive contribution to that system. This requires orientation in the history of the development of thought of the individual systems. So our primary task should be to place a philosopher in his philosophical environment. This demands a general idea of the stream of different systems of thought relating to that particular period. It is possible only when the whole literature or even the important ones of that period or of a tradition are made available. Unfortunately many important works of different schools have not yet come down to us or have not yet been published. Unless at least the important texts of different periods are published, although this is an uphill task, development of different systems cannot be historically and more closely traced. The two volumes of the *History of Indian Philosophy* by Professor E. Frauwallner of Vienna University are important contribution in this direction.

In this context I would like to point out that analysis of texts should be our first concern. Without a reliable reconstructed text, comparative study has no meaning. Our primary concern should be to judge the philosophical personalities in their particular environment and only then the ground can be prepared for further analysis and comparative study. Therefore, linguistic analysis of philosophical texts is a means to the end and not an end in itself. This is possible only when a researcher looks at a philosopher or a school without any pre-conceived ideas or biased notions. I no doubt believe in the traditional interpretation of the goal of Indian philosophy.

which seeks to make a man perfect, but I would like to emphasise that the goal is achieved neither through blind faith nor through unconditional surrender to revelation, but by whole-hearted allegiance to reasoning which only can illumine the sciences (*pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām*).

Now a few words about the origin of the chapters may be in order. I have arranged this collection into two sections: The section one deals with a short historical survey of the Navadvīpa tradition of Navya-nyāya logic followed by an appraisal of two Naiyāyikas, Ratnaśaṅkara and Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma. A synopsis of what now constitutes the first and third chapters of this book was presented at the International Sanskrit Conference (New Delhi, 1971) held under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, Govt. of India, and at the Annual Meeting of the American Oriental Society (John Hopkins University, Baltimore, U.S.A., 1970) respectively. An earlier version of the second and third chapters appeared in *Anvikṣā* (Jadavpur University, Calcutta, 1966) and in the Journal of Oriental Institute, Baroda. The chapters in section two are concerned with questions on logic and epistemology in Navya-nyāya tradition. The fourth and the seventh chapters appeared in *Anvikṣā* (1967) and the fifth and sixth chapters were published in the WZKSO (Vienna, 1968, 1975). The eighth chapter appeared in Prof. Charudev Sastri Felicitation Volume (Delhi, 1974). An earlier version of the ninth chapter was presented at the 'Conference on Philosophy and Language in Indian Culture' at the University of Toronto, Canada (September 3-4, 1974) and published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (Holland, 1977). The last chapter forms a part of my Introduction to the *Vidhisvarūpavicāra* of Gadādhara (edited by Pt. J. N. Tarkatīrtha, ed. Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1973). I wish to thank all the editors and publishers of Journals in which these essays appeared in their original form and specially to Dr. S. K. Mitra, the then Hon. Secretary, Asiatic Society, for asking me to write the introduction to the *Vidhisvarūpavicāra*.

I take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to my teacher Dr. Gaurinath Sastri for his inspiring guidance all through my academic career. My special thanks are due to Dr. Bimal Krishna Matilal, Spalding Professor of Eastern Reli-

gions and Ethics, University of Oxford, who by inviting me to the Conference on Philosophy at Toronto allowed me to present the viewpoints of Neologic of India on the problem of Semantics. I am also thankful to him for suggesting the title of the present work.

If I can claim any scientific value in my analysis of the problems presented in this work I owe this to my teacher late Professor Erich Frauwallner of the University of Vienna. During 1963-66 I had the privilege of undergoing training in textcritical method with regard to philosophical texts under that great scholar. I also wish to remember here my teacher in Navya-nyāya late Pt. Anantakumar Tarkatīrtha whose brilliant analysis of Navya-nyāya texts created in me an abiding love for this system. I am also grateful to my teacher Pt. Madhusudan Nyāyācārya for his illuminating discussions on some of the Navya-nyāya texts. I am indebted to Dr. Vachaspati Upadhyaya of Delhi University for suggesting the publication of the present collection and taking all care and interest in processing it through the press. Thanks are also due to Shri K. C. Jain of the Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi, for undertaking the publication of this work. Last but not the least, I wish to thank my wife, Sibani, for her interest in its publication.

Kurukshetra University
April 30, 1978

Gopikamohan Bhattacharya

SECTION ONE

CHAPTER I

NAVADVĪPA'S CONTRIBUTION TO NAVYA-NYĀYA

Logical speculation in India reached its consummation in the emergence of a new school of Logic (*Navyanyāya*) during the 14th century. It originated in Mithila in Bihar and in course of time spread over different centres, Navadvīpa in Bengal, Banaras and South India. In contents and methodology Navyanyāya sharply differs from Old Nyāya. It is basically an epistemological and linguistic system. Love for precision and exactitude is its primary concern. All epistemological and logical concepts are analysed in terms of definition. Some concepts exclusively peculiar to Navyanyāya, like *avacchedakatva*, *pratiyogitva* etc. made their appearance in Udayana who enjoyed highest esteem as *ācārya* in Navyanyāya circle in later period. But truly speaking Udayana (c. 930-990 A.D.) stands at a period when Old Nyāya still had its sway, although at the same time was gradually making room for the emergence of a more rigorous system of Logic, which ultimately took shape as a full-fledged system with Gaṅgeśa (c. 1300-1360 A.D.) of Mithila. His epoch-making work *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (TC) introduced a new methodology. Traditional language in Philosophy was superseded by a new set of vocabulary to keep pace with the emergence of new concepts. All branches of Sanskrit literature, viz., Grammar, Aesthetics, Law etc. adopted this new method of expression to avoid ambiguity and confusion. Gaṅgeśa's TC purports to treat four *pramāṇas*: perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. This work evoked spontaneous admiration to such an extent that the development of this school for the next 500 years is based only on the commentaries and subcommentaries on this work. But Gaṅgeśa's contribution lies more in marshalling the definitions and arguments of the earlier authors in Navyanyāya than in original thinking and in that task he has given evidence of superb ingenuity.

In Mithila Gaṅgeśa's tradition was continued by his son Vardhamāna (who however did not write any commentary on his father's work), Yajñapati Upādhyāya (c. 1410-1470 A.D.), his pupil Jayadeva Miśra (c. 1430-1490 A.D.) and Rucidatta Upādhyāya (c. 1450-1510) A.D.) etc. But at the same time a parallel school of Navyanyāya was started in Navadvīpa (in Bengal). Sir William Jones once described Navadvīpa as "the most frequented as well as the most learned University in the East. It has been and in this day, peculiarly celebrated as a school of philosophy". Unfortunately little record about the early period of this school is available till Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (c. 1460-1520 A.D.) occupied the field. The commentators of Mithila refer to a 'Gauḍa' school of Navyanyāya and their views have been criticised by Madhusūdana, Vāsudeva Miśra and Gopinātha Thakkura of Mithila. Of the pre-Raghunātha period only one work of Navyanyāya, i.e. the commentary on *TC*. (*anumāna* part only)¹ by Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma (c. 1430-1540 A.D.) has come down to us. The views ascribed to Gauḍa by the Mithila writers do not occur in the *MS* of *TC-īkā* of Vāsudeva. Moreover Vāsudeva always refers to the earlier writers as *kaścit*, *apare*, *eke*, *uttānāḥ* etc. This shows that the tradition which looks upon Vāsudeva as the pioneer of Navadvīpa school should be taken with reservation.

Vāsudeva in his *Anumānamāṇiparīkṣā* quotes the viewpoints of his teacher (*guravaḥ*) 15 times and sometimes differs from him. D.C. Bhattacharya in his pioneer work *Vaṅge Navya-nyāyacarcā* proves that here Vāsudeva refers to his father Narahari Viśārada, who was the source of his inspiration in academic pursuit. Unfortunately no work of Viśārada has yet been discovered. Excerpts from this hitherto lost work of Viśārada have been quoted by Jayadeva and Narahari, son of Yajñapati of Mithila. Viśārada might have been a senior contemporary of Yajñapati. It is interesting that Jayadeva to whom goes the credit of initiating a new school of Navyanyāya criticises the opinion of Viśārada. This shows that already in his time the logicians of the Navadvīpa school left their stamp on the Nyāya circle of Mithila, so that an invincible dialectician of the stand of Jayadeva could not totally ignore Viśārada and had to incorporate and criticise his viewpoints.

1. MS. in Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Varanasi.

Viśārada's son Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma in fact brought the Navadvīpa school on a strong footing. No doubt he had his training in the dialectical method under the tutelage of his father and was brought up in Nyāya tradition where his uncle Śrīnātha Cakravartī also commented on *TC* of Gaṅgeśa, but his talents developed through his conflict with the Mithila school, and particularly its doyen Yajñapati Upādhyāya. It is most likely that Vāsudeva in his early life was conscious of the impact made by the Mithila school on Navadvīpa circle and hence his primary task was to cause trouble to Yajñapati's school. Almost at the same time Jayadeva in Mithila launched a vehement attack against his teacher Yajñapati. Also at the same time Vāsudeva in Navadvīpa in his commentary on *TC* mercilessly attacked Yajñapati's definitions and arguments. He has cited Yajñapati on almost every issue and about 52 times. In fact with Vāsudeva the whole intelligentsia in Mithila and Bengal came to be sharply divided into two rival camps. Yajñapati's son Narahari defended his father and Vāsudeva took up the challenge and showed the inadequacy of Narahari's defence. Through this keen and acute debate between two opposing schools Vāsudeva's genius flourished—a colourful legacy so creditably inherited by his pupil, the great Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.

Of all the commentaries on *TC* Vāsudeva's is by far the best. It is not merely an elucidation of the text of Gaṅgeśa, but, so to say, an independent work in his own imitable style. That formidable cryptic style of later scholasticism is yet to be developed. Mere methodology has not yet become the main concern. Vāsudeva cares for the earlier doctrines and their sources and represents them with accuracy and ingenuity which evoke spontaneous admiration. He is more conscious of the matter than of form, and dives deep into the heart of each problem. He is aware of the theories current in his time and makes best use of them. Unfortunately the *pratyakṣa* and *śabda* sections of the work are yet to be discovered and only then the history of philosophical thought of this period can be properly reconstructed.

Vāsudeva could not found a school of his own. He is known only as the teacher of Raghunātha, although at the same time Jayadeva, in Mithila, founded a Seminary, which produced a number of logicians, viz., Bhagiratha Thakkura, Rucidatta etc. The reason seems to be that during this time already a love for cryptic language had gained ground in philosophical circle and to the contrary Vāsudeva was fond of lucidity and keenly interested in elucidation of concepts rather taking pleasure in formal niceties. Another reason may be that Vāsudeva was converted to monistic Vedānta and left Bengal as a court-philosopher of King Pratāparudra of Orissa, where ultimately he turned into a follower of Lord Chaitanya. His inclination for Vedānta started already during his stay at Navadvīpa, which he inherited from his father who has been referred to as *Vedāntavidyāmaya*. Moreover, the overwhelming popularity of his pupil Raghunātha Śīromaṇi cast his work into oblivion and it was gradually forgotten. The result was that Vāsudeva¹ could not initiate a tradition. Not a single commentary on his work was written by any scholar of later period. The Naiyāyikas of Bengal commented on *Āloka* of Jayadeva of Mithila, demonstrated their genius by dilating on one single definition of *Dīdhiti* of Raghunātha, but never cared to appreciate the value of the contribution made by Vāsudeva. His pupil Raghunātha came to monopolize the attention of later students and commentators. With Raghunātha is marked the glorious period of Navyanyāya in Navadvīpa. He is the product of the healthy controversy between Yajñapati of Mithila and Vāsudeva of Navadvīpa. Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti* commentary on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* found a galaxy of commentators. This is the result of the intricate and formidable style of his writing which took shape in Gaṅgeśa and further developed in Jayadeva of Mithila. But Raghunātha completely overshadowed Jayadeva, although in bulk Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti* is less than that of all earlier commentaries on TC. In style Raghunātha is nearer to Jayadeva than to his own teacher

1. Some of the peculiar doctrines introduced by Vāsudeva are : (a) qualified is something more than non-qualified (*Viśiṣṭasyātirikṭatvāt*, *Jāg.* p. 92; *Viśiṣṭaṇca kevalād anyat*, *TCd.* p. 222) (b) bothness is one qualified by the other (*ubhayatvam ekaviśiṣṭāparatvam*, *TCd.* p. 222, 1-2 ; *Jāg.* pp. 92, 153, 159).

Vāsudeva. On every point he refers to his predecessors, without naming any one of them, sometimes takes them to task but seldom expresses categorically his own opinion. He likes to remain in the background. He frequently refers to the views of Upādhyāya, Miśra, Sārvabhauma, but presents their views in such a manner that sometimes it becomes difficult to identify them in the available work preserved in *Mss.* of those authors. The *Dīdhiti* on *TC anumāna* part only is available in print. Only an insignificant portion of the *pratyakṣa* part was published long ago. And this is the case with most of the later commentators. From this period onward the study of *TC* was confined to *anumāna* part only and the commentators amused with formulation of definitions only. Although by conviction a Naiyāyika, Raghunātha was alive to other systems. He commented on *Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayana which evinces his deep acquaintance with the latest phase of Buddhist metaphysics and logic, on *Nyāya-Līlāvatī* of Śrīvallabha and wrote a subcommentary on Vardhamāna's *Prakāśa* on *Kiraṇāvalī*. In these works he interpreted the prevalent concepts and terms in Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika systems in Navyanyāya terminology. This shows that he tried to reinstate the study of earlier classics of Udayana, Śrīvallabha and Vardhamāna—the study of which had considerably declined during this period.

Raghunātha's originality is evinced more in two monographs—*Ākhyātavāda* and *Nañvāda*, the former on the meaning of verbs and the latter on negative expressions. The most important is *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* which is a reworking on the Vaiśeṣika categories. Thus contrary to the accepted doctrine in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school he says : space, time and *ākāśa* are identical with God; God is not of gross magnitude; atoms and dyads as separate from triad are unproved; triads are the ultimate parts of a substance; mind is identical with triad; *prthaktva* (separateness), proximity and remoteness are not qualities but identical with the substance in which they are said to inhere; *Vīśeṣa* (particular) is rejected; *Sattā* (Being), *guṇatva* (qualityhood) etc. are not universals; *Samavāya* (Inherence) is not one, but many. He adds a series of new categories : moment (*kṣaṇa*), *svatva*, power (*śakti*), number (*saṁkhyā*), *vaiśiṣṭya*, *viśayata*, *tattva*, *pratiyogitva*, *adhikaraṇatva* and *sambandhatva*.

And the most daring is his attack on the concept of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, a method adopted in Navyanyāya school for the determination of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*).

Raghunātha's credit lies in initiating a school of his own. Even during his lifetime he was regarded by his contemporaries as the founder of this new school (*navyāḥ*). Jānakīnātha (author of *Maṇimarīcī*, undiscovered) and Kaṇāda Tarkavāgīśa (commentator on *TC.*, unpublished) have referred to his views on several occasions. His another contemporary Haridāsa Nyāyālaṃkāra perhaps wrote a commentary on *TCd.* (undiscovered). Later development of this school had its nucleus in the *Dīdhiti* commentary of Raghunātha. In course of time Navyanyāya had his sway in South India, in Maharastra and in Banaras and the texts current in these parts of the country were the commentaries on *Dīdhiti*. Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa's commentary on *Dīdhiti* was popular in South and West India. A large number of Ms. copies of this commentary are to be found in Poona, Madras, Kashmir, Tanjore, etc. The commentary of Rāmakṛṣṇa Cakravartī was popular in Banaras. A report on Navadvīpa Seminary published in Calcutta Monthly Register 1791 shows that "about 52 pundits of considerable note in the republic of letters have written each a commentary on Śiromaṇi's treatise of philosophy."

Navyanyāya in Navadvīpa rose to the height of glory in thought and expression during the period of commentators of Raghunātha. Considering the style we may reasonably draw a line between the earlier and later commentaries. The former is marked by lucidity and is more helpful in understanding the exact viewpoint of the original text. In this category may be included : (a) *Prasāriṇī* commentary of Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvaabhauma (c. 1500-1560), the earliest commentary so far discovered on *Dīdhiti* (b) *Prakāśa* of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa (c. 1520-1580) which was accepted as a standard commentary on *Dīdhiti* in all parts of India. Bhavānanda wrote commentaries on all the works of Raghunātha. These two writers carried on the study of *Dīdhiti*, but were completely eclipsed by Jagadīśa (c. 1550-1610) and Gadādhara (c. 1610-1710) representing the period of later commentators of *Dīdhiti*. During this period also belongs Mathurānātha whose commentary on *Dīdhiti* is

yet unpublished, but his commentary on *TC* has been a standard work of the school for the last 400 years.

At least sixteen commentaries are known to have been written by Mathurānātha (c. 1540-1600) apart from a monumental and independent work *Sidhāntarahasya* (unpublished). Mathurānātha's commentary on *TC* shows that before him a number of commentaries on *Dīdhiti* were current to which he refers as *prāñcaḥ*, *navyāḥ*, etc. Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti* is difficult in style and unstraightforward in presentation. As a result two quite different kinds of commentaries were produced on his *Dīdhiti*: Commentaries of Kṛṣṇadāsa and Bhavānanda, which are welcome series of simple explanation of *Dīdhiti*'s texts and advanced commentaries of Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa and Gadādhara—which are less commentaries in the strict sense of the term, but are further philosophical discussions arising from different knotty points in the text. In this task Mathurānātha often departs from Raghunātha's school. The standard available commentaries on *Dīdhiti* are those of Jagadīśa and Gadādhara. Gadādhara was more conversant with the prevalent theories in the school and could raise important philosophical problems. He was the most original of all the commentators of Raghunātha—and his work is till today the source of displaying academic feats in logical debates.

Jagadīśa was in his time at the helm of the Naiyāyikas in Navadvīpa adorning the title of *Jagadguru*. He wrote *Mayūkha* commentary on all parts of *TC* of which the *anumāna* part is published.¹ His commentary on *Dīdhiti* of which only *anumāna* part is available in print, is widely read in all Nyāya Seminaries. As a commentator he is faithful. He attempted to revive the study of Vaiśeṣika philosophy by formulating definitions of Vaiśeṣika concepts in Navyanyāya terminology in his *Sūkti* commentary on *Dravya* and *Guṇa* sections of Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha*. This was practically the last attempt to expound the Vaiśeṣika doctrines and adapt them to the dialectic of Navyanyāya. Jagadīśa achieved great popularity for an independent and most original work *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, apart from a large

1. Ed. Gaurinath Sastri, Sanskrit Sahitya Parishat, Calcutta.

number of short monographs, viz, *Tarkāmṛta*, *Nyāyādarśa*. His *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* is the most important work on Semantics. This work gradually superseded all previous works on Semantics in Navyanyāya school, e.g. *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of TC or the short manuals of Raghunātha, viz. *Nañvāda*, *Ākhyātavāda* etc. It contains dialectics of sentence-meaning in all its ramifications and provides ample evidence of the author's deep study in Mīmāṃsā and Grammar, the systems which have been subjected to scathing criticism by Jagadīśa. In fact, the Nyāya theory of sentence-meaning was placed on strong footing at the hands of Jagadīśa.

After Jagadīśa some authors carried on the study of *Dīdhiti*, viz, Gopīkānta Nyāyālaṃkāra, Govinda Cakravartī, Rāmanātha Vidyāvācaspati, Rāmacandra Nyāyavāgīśa and above all Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, the author of a number of short manuals (*vāda*) on epistemological problems.

But all these authors were completely eclipsed by Gadādhara, the last prolific writer of Navyanyāya. Gadādhara's commentary on *TCd.* is more systematic and more comprehensive and often appears to be a regular treatise, advanced and very extensive in its scope. He produced commentaries on *Āloka* of Jayadeva, on *Nyāya-Kusumāñjali* of Udayana, and on Raghunātha's comms. of *Ātmatattvaviveka*, *TC* and *Nañvāda*—apart from a large number of short introductory manuals called *vādas*. His manual on *Viśayatā* is illuminating, where he sharply differs from the school of Jagadīśa, and Gadādhara's stand on the issue received the approval of Navyanaiyāyikas in later times. Gadādhara has furnished the evidence of his penetrating insight and critical observation in his classical work on fallacy, *Sāmānyaniruktiṭīkā*. His *Vyutpattivāda* is honoured even by the eminent grammarians of the Pāṇinian school. During the period of his activity Navadvīpa's glory rose to its height and students from all parts of India flocked there so that no less than 4000 students and 550 teachers are said to have been studying at the Seminaries at that time (Calcutta Review, July 1855).

Since the beginning of eighteenth century a new technique of writing made its appearance. We do not come across any sustained work of this period. This is a period of short

dialectical notes called *kroḍapatras*, which record the results of philosophical disputations in which the scholars primarily indulged or short notes pointing out the inconsistency in the expressions of Jayadeva, Mathurānātha or Gadādhara, and in the results of their observations, or sometimes elucidations and advanced notes on certain knotty problems of Navyanyāya. Of the authors of such small treatises worth the name are Jayadeva Tarkālaṃkāra, Viśvanātha Nyāyālaṃkāra, Śivarāma Vācaspati, Jayakṛṣṇa Tarkācārya and lastly Śaṅkara Tarkavāgīśa, the last doyen of the glorious period of Navadvīpa. A report of Navadvīpa Seminary published in Calcutta Monthly Register describes Śaṅkara as "the head of the college of Nuddea and the first philosopher and scholar in the whole University who brought to its height the present vicious system of disputatious logomachy which prevails in Nuddea" (Proc. A.S.B. 1867). Equally he was a scholar in Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā and Sāṅkhya—with the result that he could attract the largest number of students numbering about three hundred.

Another academic figure was Golakanātha Nyāyaratna (1806-1855 A.D.) whose greatest achievement was a dissertation on Gadādhara's *Sāmānyanirukti*. With his death the most flourishing days of this system of Indian logic came almost to a standstill.

CHAPTER II

RATNAKOṢAKĀRA—A FORGOTTEN NAIYĀYIKA

Although Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya is generally looked upon as the founder of the modern school of Indian Logic, still the ample materials now available to us show that Gaṅgeśa stands at a transitory moment, rather at the end of a creative period of Navyanyāya and that in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* an attempt has been made to collect and systematise the viewpoints of his predecessors¹. Ratnakoṣakāra of Mithila is one such author of the pre-Gaṅgeśa period, some of whose views have been respectfully cited by Gaṅgeśa himself as well as by eminent Naiyāyikas of the pre-Gaṅgeśa and post-Gaṅgeśa period. Unfortunately no manuscript of *Ratnakoṣa* has yet been discovered, but its authorship has been finally settled. The author was Taraṇi Miśra². A study of the available fragments and interpretations thereof in later period shows that this lost work covered the entire field of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* and that it was an independent treatise of discursive nature. The work exercised such a strong influence on the Navyanaiyāyikas through centuries that Harirāma Tarkavāgiśa, the preceptor of famous Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, had to compose an independent tract of considerable size called *Ratnakoṣamatavicāra* with a view to counteract the viewpoints of Ratnakoṣakāra. The available fragments of *Ratnakoṣa* which have been identified are on the problems of *nigrahasthāna* (point of defeat), *sāmānya* (acc. to Ratnakoṣakāra *sāmānya* is of two types : *jāti* and *upādhi* “*Ratnakoṣa*-

1. Vide Frauwallner, E., *Prabhākaropādhyāya*. Wiener Zeitschrift fuer die Kunde Sued-und Ostasiens, Band IX, 1965.

Steinkellner, E. : *Vardhamāna als Kommentator Gaṅgeśas*, Ibid. Band VIII, 1964.

2. Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya : *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithila* pp. 77, 150

kṛtas tu dvividhaṃ sāmānyam jātir upādhiś ca". *Nyāyanibandha-prakāśa*, pp. 194-95), *kathā* (cf. *na vā vādavitaṇḍāvijigīṣu tattva-mātranirṇītiṣu kathā caturthī iti ratnaśaṅkārāmatam upādeyam*, *Vādivinoda*, pp. 11-12), a new definition of *Vādakathā*, (*lābha-pūjā-khyātir anuddiśya pravartitaṃ vādalakṣaṇam iti ratnaśaṅkārārah*. *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, p. 341), *samavāya* (relation of two types: *saṁyoga* and *viśeṣaṇatā* and rejection of *samavāya*, *ibid.* p. 468), *kāla* (*Ratnaśaṅkārā* believes that time is perceptible. cf. *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithila*. p. 79). But of the available fragments the most important are those on the problem of *Upādhi* (imposed property) and the fallacy *Satpratipakṣa* (counter-balanced probans), the treatment of which bears ample testimony to *Ratnaśaṅkārā*'s free thinking and originality of thought.

In the *pūrvapakṣa* section of *Upādhivāda* Gaṅgeśa cites as many as 12 definitions of *Upādhi* and refutes them accordingly. The last definition, which left a definite mark on Gaṅgeśa in the formulation of his final definition of *Upādhi* may reasonably be attributed to *Ratnaśaṅkārā*. The definition runs as follows: *paryavasitasādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhiḥ* (*TC.*, p. 331). Of the commentators on *TC.* *Yājñapati* is silent on the source of this definition. But *Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma* clearly states: *Ratnaśaṅkārāmatam āha paryavasiteti*, *Comm. on TC.* fol. 94, 2. (*Saraswati Bhavan Library Manuscript*, Banares, no. Sanskrit 185). *Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa* is more clear on the point: *Ratnaśaṅkārālakṣaṇam āśaṅkate*. (Variant reading on *TC.* p. 330). Further it is worthy of notice that *Maṇikaṇṭha*, one of the noted authorities on *Navyanyāya* consulted by Gaṅgeśa, in his *Nyāyaratna* cites exactly the same definition and brings in an elucidation of the same, which he clearly ascribes to *Ratnaśaṅkārā*. *Nṛsiṃhayajvan* in his commentary on *NR.* called *Dyuti-mālikā* states: *Ratnaśaṅkārābhīmataparyavasitaśabdārtham āha*. *Maṇikaṇṭha* cites as many as eight definitions of *Upādhi* and in his elucidation of this definition, which stands fifth in order, he attributes the interpretation categorically to *Ratnaśaṅkārā* (cf. *NR.*, p. 86). The interpretation and illustration relating to this definition as offered by Gaṅgeśa corresponds almost verbatim to that of *Maṇikaṇṭha*. Even in his criticism of this definition Gaṅgeśa seems to have been profoundly influenced by *Maṇi-*

kaṇṭha. Citations from *Ratnaśāstra* in *Nyāyaratna* show that Ratnaśāstrakāra certainly preceded Maṇikanṭha. Vallabhācārya, another predecessor of Gaṅgeśa whom Gaṅgeśa refers to in a number of instances, nowhere makes any reference to Ratnaśāstrakāra. This leads us to place our author at a period between Vallabha and Maṇikanṭha. The supposition is further strengthened if we bear in mind the manner in which Maṇikanṭha and Gaṅgeśa quote Ratnaśāstrakāra's definition and his own interpretation. The order in which Maṇikanṭha treats this definition makes the impression that the definition, according to him, is certainly an improvement on the preceding definitions including that of Vallabha. Vallabha's definition is as follows : *sādhyakṛtsnasahacārīṇaḥ sādhanāikadeśavṛttitvam*. (*Nyāyalīlāvati*, p. 502). Maṇikanṭha and Gaṅgeśa refer to this definition as—*sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvam*. (*Nyāyaratna*, p. 70, cf. *TC*. pp. 294-295). Thereafter various attempts have been made to insert necessary changes in this definition (cf. "*sādhyavyāpakatve sati...*, *sādhyasamavyāpakatve sati...*, *pakṣadharmāvacchinnaśādhyavyāpakatve sati etc.*") in order to fit in particular cases, thus giving the definition more and more accurate form. Ratnaśāstrakāra finds all these definitions inaccurate and the improvements therein insufficient and thus gives the definition a more flexible character by inserting the term *pariyavasita* (extracted) as qualifier of the probandum.

The term *pariyavasita* serves the following purpose. In course of philosophical disputations the opponent's attempt would be to point out an imposed property with which the probans is necessarily associated and the discovery of which works as a deterrent towards inference. According to the definition such an imposed property must always pervade the probandum but not the probans. So the crucial point is to mark whether the probandum is pervaded by such imposed property. In order to fulfil the demand of the definition particular nature of individual cases should be taken into account and accordingly should be qualified by some property. Thus Ratnaśāstrakāra gives the probandum a more universal character and thereby makes it more inclusive.

Ratnaśāstrakāra next embarks upon the exact denotation of *pariyavasita*, which according to him *pakṣadharmatābalalabhya-*

tvam. Here the term *pakṣadharmatā* bears a completely different significance than it is ordinarily used in Navyanyāya, e.g. when we use the term in relation to the probans (*hetoh pakṣadharmatā*). Nor it is *pakṣadharmāvacchinna* of the second definition. Here it means that the probandum must be such as it subsists in the subject of the inference of the proponent and the imposed property pointed out by the opponent should pervade such a probandum. Then and then only it would turn out to be an imposed property in the strict sense of the term. In order to make the point clear Ratnaśaṅkārā takes the help of an illustration in which we should not go into details.

Now a study of this *Ratnaśaṅkārā* fragment :

“*paryavasitatvaṃ pakṣadharmatābalalabhyatvaṃ. yathā ‘śabdo nityatvātiriktaṭtaddharmāṭiriktaḍdharmavān, prameyatvāḍ’ ity atra kṛtakatvaṃ upādhiḥ paryavasitasyānityatvasya vyāpakah, kṛtakatvaṃ cet sādhyate, tadā tatra paryavasitaḍkṛtakatvavyāpakam ityanityatvaṃ upādhitvenopapādyate. ataeva ‘vādyuktasādhyaniyamacyuto’pi kathakair upādhir udbhāvyah|paryavasitaṃ niyamayan dūṣakatābījasāmrāḍyāt| iti Ratnaśaṅkārāḥ.*” (*Nyāyaratna*, p. 85)

shows that such a formulation of the *Upādhi*-definition led Ratnaśaṅkārā to propound a novel theory on the wellknown problem of ‘*dūṣakatābīja*’, on which a lot of discussions was carried on by the Navyanaiyāyikas. The general opinion is that an imposed property invalidates a probans, as it points out the deviation (*vyabhicāronnāyaka*). But when Ratnaśaṅkārā in his definition takes into consideration *vyāpakatva* in relation to *paryavasitasādhyā* and not to the *sādhyā* as it stands in the inference, *vyabhicāritva* would also be inferred in relation to *paryavasitasādhyā*. Such knowledge of deviation (*vyabhicārajñāna*) would in no way contradict the knowledge of universal concomitance which has reference to the probandum as it stands in the inference. Perhaps Ratnaśaṅkārā thought of this probable difficulty and hence rejected the traditional theory of *vyabhicāronnāyakatva* as ‘*dūṣakatābīja*’. Almost all commentators on *TC*. are unanimous on the point that hence according to Ratnaśaṅkārā *satpratipakṣonnāyakatva* (causing the emergence of counterbalanced

probans) is the reason thereof that an imposed property frustrates an inference (*dūṣakatābīja*) (cf. *uktadoṣaparihārāt Ratnakoṣakāramatam āha paryavasiteti| pakṣadharmatābalalabhyam tajjñānabalalabhyam ..satpratipakṣotthāpakatayā upādher dūṣakatvāt*, Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma's comm. on TC. Fol. 94.2 ; TC-*didhiti*. p. 756, Asiatic Society ed. with TC.-*didhiti-prakāśa* of Bhavānanda).

To be precise : In case of counterbalanced probans we have two separate mutually contradictory synthetic judgements (*parāmarśa*) by means of which two different contradictory theses are respectively sought to be proved. The result would be a complete deadlock frustrating the possibility of any inference altogether. In the point under consideration also (i.e. if the imposed property be discovered in relation to the extracted probandum) the thesis of the opponent could never be established, for the simple reason that the synthetic judgement of the proponent would counteract and consequently frustrate the opponent's inference. Thus in fact, according to Ratnakoṣakāra, an imposed property and the fallacy called counterbalanced probans serve the same purpose that both of them render the inference altogether impossible (cf. *Māthurī*, p. 330, Bibliotheca ed.).

The next problem with which the name of Ratnakoṣakāra is associated and to which almost all Naiyāyikas of the later period devoted much attention, is on the fallacy called *satpratipakṣa* (counterbalanced probans). In the *Satpratipakṣasiddhānta* section of TC (pp. 871-896) Gaṅgeśa after giving his own definition of *satpratipakṣa*, introduces a long discussion on *dūṣakatābīja*. In this context he cites a long passage, which he categorically ascribes to Ratnakoṣakāra. It runs as follows :

Ratnakoṣakāras tu satpratipakṣābhyām pratyekam svasādhyanumitih samśayarūpā janyate viruddhobhayajñānasāmagryāḥ samśayajanakatvāt samśayadvārā aya dūṣakatvam. na ca samśayarūpā nānumitih bādhasyeva virodhyupasthiter anumitisāmagrīvighātakatvenāvadhāraṇāt, anyathā bādhe 'py anumityāpatter iti vācyam. adhikabalatayā bādhenā pratibandhāt tulyabalatvād anumitih syād eva sāmagrīsattvāt. sādhyābhāvabodhasya ca tatra pratibandhakatvam na tu t-bodhakasya cakṣurādeḥ pratyekam nirṇāyakatvenā-

*vadhāritāt katham saṁśaya iti cet na pratyekād hi
jñānam utpadyamānam arthāt saṁśayo na tu pratyekaṁ
saṁśayajanakatvam iti mene (TC., pp. 885-888)*

Thereafter Gaṅgeśa criticises the above viewpoint of Ratnaśaṅkāra. Gaṅgeśa here does not refer to the definition of *satpratipakṣa* as might have been formulated by Ratnaśaṅkāra. But his predecessor Maṇikanṭha in his *Nyāyaratna* clearly cites the definition : *saṁśayavirodhitulyadvayaaviśayānumitijanakatvaṁ satpratipakṣatvam iti Ratnaśaṅkaḥ*. NR. pp., 181-82. Śaṅkara Miśra also in his *Vādivinoda* refers to the same definition with a few variants, which also he attributes to Ratnaśaṅkāra :— *virodhidharmadvayaaviśayānumitijanakatvaṁ saṁśayānām prakaraṇasamatvam iti Ratnaśaṅkārtaḥ*. *Vādivinoda*, p. 17.

The above definition and its elucidation as presented by Gaṅgeśa prove beyond doubt Ratnaśaṅkāra as a free thinker, who does not hesitate to subject the traditional theories to severe criticism and thus introduce a new idea. It has already been mentioned that in the case of counterbalanced probans the probans is vitiated by a counterreason advanced by the opponent to prove a contradictory thesis. To take a concrete example : The Mīmāṃsaka in order to prove the eternity of word advances the argument : 'Word is imperishable, since it is amorphous like space'. The Naiyāyika presents a contradictory argument : 'Word is transitory, since it is a product like a jar'. Now both these arguments by themselves fulfil the pre-requisites of valid reasoning. The result however is that the inference would be vitiated and the theses of both the proponent and the opponent would remain unestablished. But here Ratnaśaṅkāra clearly asserts that a counterbalanced probans does not render the inference altogether impossible. His approach to the problem seems to have been directed from this perspective : If synthetic judgement is there, the operation of the inference would be immediately effected, since the former is the pre-condition of the latter. The existence of cause must necessitate the emergence of the effect. But the point is that here two irreconcilable predicates are alternatively ascribed to the one and the same subject. And consequently such an inference, which results from a counterbalanced probans, can never be assertory in character (*niścayātmaka*), but rather it assumes the character of doubt.

Thus Ratnakoṣakāra invites our attention to this new point that it can never be held that inference should necessarily be assertory. It would be such only when one and the single predicate is ascribed to the selfsame subject, but in case of alternative predicates ascribed to the selfsame subject the inference would be of the nature of doubt and herein lies the reason as to why a counterbalanced probans is looked upon as a recognised fallacy (*dūṣakatābīja*). Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa makes capital out of this point and introduces a slashing criticism of the same in his *Ratnakoṣamatavicāra*, the manuscripts of which are preserved in a number of Ms. libraries in India and abroad.

CHAPTER III

VĀSUDEVA SĀRVABHAUMA

Vāsudeva (c. 1430-1540 A.D.) is known to be the teacher of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, the astute logician of the sixteenth century. Vāsudeva's name is also associated with Caitanya and most of the biographers of Caitanya are eloquent on the historic debate between them at Puri when Caitanya went there on his religious mission. On the evidence of Jayānanda it is ascertained that Vāsudeva, the founder of Navya-nyāya tradition in Bengal, left Navadvīpa, the centre of learning, being oppressed by the Muslim ruler and settled at Puri as a Court Pandit of Pratāparudra, while his brother migrated to Banaras.¹ But in his early life he founded a school at Navadvīpa, established his name as a logician and tradition says that Raghunātha, his pupil, completely overshadowed him by his trenchant logic and overwhelming popularity. Raghunātha, as usual, never mentions the name of his teachers, but a study of Raghunātha's commentary on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa shows that he was to a great extent influenced by Vāsudeva. On a number of occasions he quotes Vāsudeva, although he does not mention his name. The commentators such as Jagadīśa, Gadādhara

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1. Vide. *Caitanyamaṅgala*, *Utkalakhaṇḍa*. Jayānanda (1500 A.D.) was a young man of 20 years when Caitanya left his human form and hence had ample opportunity of observing the socio-political conditions of Bengal. According to Jayānanda, the Muslims of Pirālya, a village near Navadvīpa, incited King Hussain Shah of Bengal against the Brahmins of Navadvīpa as a result of which the king oppressed the Brahmins of the city and Vāsudeva had to flee to Orissa out of fear of torture. That famine broke just before the birth of Caitanya is also corroborated by *Caitanyabhāgavata* of Vṛndāvanadāsa. Vāsudeva passed the last years of his life at Banaras.

etc. testify them to be the opinions of Vāsudeva. D.C. Bhattacharya tried to identify some of the opinions attributed to Vāsudeva by the commentators in an incomplete manuscript of a commentary of the *anumāna* portion of *TC* and the ms, although it lacks in beginning and colophon, is accepted by M.M. Gopināth Kavirāja¹ and D. C. Bhattacharya² as the work of Vāsudeva. I have undertaken a critical edition of this hitherto unpublished work and my preliminary study of the ms. reveals the following facts about Vāsudeva's originality as a logician, his method and critical insight.

The section called *Vyāptipañcaka* in *TC* contains five definitions of pervasion (*vyāpti*) prevalent during Gaṅgeśa's period. Gaṅgeśa records them and finally rejects them on the ground that they do not apply to cases of universal concomitance between two everpresent properties (*kevalānvayī*). It is worthnoting that no predecessor of Raghunātha has endeavoured to interpret these definitions in details but rather left only a few occasional remarks, while Raghunātha explains the definitions as a faithful commentator; and here at least on one occasion he was indebted to Vāsudeva. When explaining the second definition, viz, Pervasion is the non-occurrence in the locus of the absence of the probandum which (i.e. locus) differs from that which the probandum possesses (*sādhyaavadbhinnasādhyaābhāvavadavṛttitvam*. *TC* p. 77, 4) Raghunātha seeks to interpret the first part of the definition, i.e. *sādhyaavad-bhinna*, as qualifying the absence of the probandum. Or, in other words, the definition demands that the probans should not occur in a locus of such an absence of the probandum which occurs in a locus, other than that of the probandum. With such a formulation the difficulty involved in the first definition (viz., *sādhyaābhāvavadavṛttitvam*), that it does not apply to cases of incomplete occurrence (*avyāpyavṛtti*) can easily be avoided.

The commentator Kṛṣṇadāsa³ points out that Raghunātha interprets the definition in such a peculiar way so as to avoid

1. *Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature*.
2. *Vāṅgālir Sārasvat Avadān*.
3. Kṛṣṇadāsa, *Anumānadīhitiprasārīṇī* (Adp) p. 40. cf. also Bhattacharya, *Vāṅgālir Sārasvat avadān*, p. 38.

a difficulty raised by Vāsudeva¹. A study of Vāsudeva's commentary on TC² reveals that Vāsudeva does not think that the only purpose behind the formulation of def. 2 is to include cases of invariable concomitance where the probandum is of incomplete occurrence. For, he thinks that the def. 2 could well serve such purpose without the adjunct *sādhyābhāva* (absence of probandum). It seems that Vāsudeva had in his mind the interpretation of the definition as he got it from tradition (not of course from Yajñapati) which considers the first part of the definition, viz. *sādhyavadbhinna*, as qualifying the locus in which the absence of the probandum occurs. Vāsudeva, as the ms. shows, is absolutely silent on the point as to how the charge of superfluity occurs. He only remarks that as the adjunct *sādhyābhāva* is superfluous def. 2 should be rejected. The commentators on *Dīdhiti* provide us with a satisfactory explanation of superfluity which they ascribe to Vāsudeva.³ They think that according to Vāsudeva mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*) is of the nature of complete occurrence (*vyāpyavṛtti*) and as such when anywhere *sādhyābhāva* occurs, it follows automatically that it is different from that in which the probandum occurs. Conversely, if anything is different from that in which the probandum occurs, it follows that in the same locus the absence of the probandum occurs and hence the superfluity of the term *sādhyābhāva* becomes evident.

In the section on *Vyadhikaraṇābhāva* (an absence of which the counterpositiveness is limited by a non-concurrent property) Raghunātha refers to fourteen definitions of *Vyāpti* of which two are his own formulations and the rest are attributed to his predecessor, viz., Śrīnātha Cakravartin, Pragalbha, Jayadeva and Vāsudeva. The definition attributed to Vāsudeva by the commentators can however be exactly found in the ms. since it was Raghunātha's technique not to quote the opponent as it is, but he was rather fond of referring to it in his own way, i.e. by referring to its clarified version. The earliest of the known commentators of *Dīdhiti* Kṛṣṇadāsa points out this peculiar feature of Raghunātha (cf. *parīṣkurvan*). The defs. run as follows :

1. Kṛṣṇadāsa : *Anumānadīdhitiprasāriṇī*.
2. Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Banaras Ms. No. 185.
3. Kṛṣṇadāsa, *Adp.* p. 40.

Def. 1 : *Pare tu vṛttimadvṛttayo yāvantaḥ sādhyābhāvavad-vṛttivābhāvas tadvattvaṃ vyāptiḥ*¹

Def. 2 : *Anye tu vṛttimadvṛttayo yāvantaḥ sādhyābhāvādhi-karaṇavṛttivābhāvas tadvattvaṃ*²

compare these two definitions with Vāsudeva's :

Sādhyābhāvakūṭādhikaraṇavṛttivābhāvā vṛttimadvṛttayo yāvantas tāvadāśrayatvaṃ vyāptiriti vivakṣaṇāt.

In his explanation of the def. 2 Raghunātha quotes verbatim a line from Vāsudeva :

tathā ca svavyāpakībhūtasādhyatāvaccchedakavyāpaka-pratīyogitāko'pi bodhyaḥ. Dīdhiti, p. 206, 3-4.

cf. Vās. 3 (ed. Frauwallner, WZKSO)

It is to be noted that the definitions attributed to Vāsudeva by commentators occur in the *pūrvapakṣa* section of Vāsudeva.

In his treatment on *vyādhikaraṇābhāva* Vāsudeva, as usual with him, explains and rejects the viewpoints of his predecessors such as Yajñapati, Jayadeva and Rucidatta, none of whose works has yet been published. But a study of the respective mss. shows that Vāsudeva is more faithful in the presentation of the views of his opponents, brings out the logical problems involved in a more lucid manner and I have no hesitation in remarking that his understanding of problems is more accurate than that of any one of his predecessors, although he brings little as his own positive contribution. His criticism of Yajñapati is more vehement and elaborate, as he refers to him at least 52 times in the entire ms., occasionally with sarcastical remarks. He had to take into account Yajñapati more seriously as the latter was the founder of Mithila school of Navyanyāya still exerting influence on the neologicians of Mithila and Vāsudeva wanted to open a school in Bengal and hence he tried to assert his influence on the Bengal circle of logicians.

In the *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* section, Raghunātha, while explaining the term *pratīyogī* in the final definition of *vyāpti* in *TC*, introduces the concept of 'limitor' (*avaccchedaka*) and suggests that here 'counterpositive' (*pratīyogī*) should be taken in its

1. Bhavānanda, *Anumānadīdhiti prakāśa*, p. 196.

2. *Ibid*, p. 205.

entirety for which we need a universal operator namely the limiter of counterpositiveness. In this connection Raghunātha refers to two original views,¹ attributed by the commentators to Vāsudeva : (a) Bothness (*ubhayatva*) is nothing but the otherness qualified by the one (*ubhayatvam ekaviśiṣṭāparatvam*) (b) a pure entity is different from a qualified entity. Thus, to Vāsudeva pure existence (*śuddha-sattā*) is more extensive than existence qualified by otherness than quality and action. To a student of Navyanyāya it is a wellknown problem and all logicians after Vāsudeva categorically assert the identity of pure entity with qualified entity.²

To turn to the nature of 'bothness,' Vāsudeva's mention as *atra kaścit* shows that before him Nyāya considered 'bothness' as a separate property. In the example, 'the chair and the table both', the predecessors of Vāsudeva, as also his disciple Raghunātha would say that there 'bothness' or for that matter 'duality' (*dvaitva*) also, is an attribute which occurs in both the chair and the table through a peculiar relation known as *paryāpti*. But Vāsudeva would explain the above cognition as 'the table qualified by chair'. So in this case 'bothness' = table-ness + chairness, and not a separate attribute from 'tableness' (cf. *na ca pratyekabhinnam ubhayam*. Vās. ms. fol. 33.1). Similarly in Vāsudeva's view the 'absence of both table and chair' would amount to the 'absence of table qualified by chair' or *vice-versa*.

Now we turn to a type of Navyanyāya concept of absence to show Vāsudeva's methodology in pursuing a point and his originality. This is the problem of generic absence (*sāmānyābhāva*) vs. specific absence (*viśeṣābhāva*).

At the outset it should be made clear that Nyāya rejects any such thing as pure negation.³ When we speak of an absence it must be an absence of something, which in Nyāya technical language is termed as absential counterpositive (*abhāvīyapratī-*

1. See, Kṛṣṇa. p. 144 Bhav. p. 322, Jagadīśa, p. 222.

2. Bhav. p. 121 (*viśiṣṭasya atiriktatvam iti sārvabhaumamatam*) : cf. also Jāg., pp. 153, 159, 247.

3. Matilal, B.K.. *The Navyanyāya Doctrine of Negation*, p. 52.

yogī). Now let us take the following two instances of absence, viz.,

- (a) The cup is not on the table.
- (b) The ink-pot is not on the table.

The two absences can be distinguished from each other since the things negated differ. But Nyāya holds that even if the counterpositives are identical their absences would be different, if of course, the limitors (*avacchedaka*) of their counterpositiveness differ. In (a) 'cup-ness' will be such limitor, whereas in (b) 'ink-pot-ness' is the limitor. So in these instances the counterpositives as well as the limitors of counterpositiveness differ and hence the absences also differ. But we may say :

- (c) 'Max Müller is absent'
- and
- (d) 'The author of *India, what it can teach us* is absent'.

In (c) and (d) the things to be negated are the same, but the two absences differ, since the counterpositiveness in (c) is limited by the individual character (*tadvyaktitva*) of the given person i.e. Max Müller, whereas in (d) it is limited by the property of being the author of '*India, what it can teach us*'. Similarly, Nyāya differentiates between generic absence and specific absence of a pot. The former is illustrated by

- (a) 'There is no pot on the ground' and the latter by
- (b) 'There is no blue pot on the ground.'

In these two absences the limitors of the property of being counterpositive differ. In (a) 'pure (*śuddha*) potness' is the limitor while in (b) 'blue-potness' is the limitor.

Gaṅgeśa while differentiating between generic and specific absence, states the following argument : We cognize, air has neither dark, red or any type of colour known to us. Then it becomes inexplicable how, in spite of this, such doubt arises, viz., 'Is there colour in air or not' or 'if air has colour or not'. If the totality of absences of all specific colours are held to be identical with the absence of colour as such, emergence of such doubt would be uncalled for.

The necessity of a generic absence distinct from the specific absences or from their collection (*kūṭa*) has cropped up to

avoid a difficult situation as follows. Let us consider a valid case of inference, viz. 'The mountain has fire because of smoke'. Now if we consider individual instances of fire, i.e., kitchen fire, mountain fire, etc., we can easily state that in the locus of smoke (i.e. mark), say in the mountain, kitchen fire is absent and in this way individual absences of fire can be shown in any locus of smoke. Thus a valid case of inference would turn out faulty. To avoid this difficult situation Nyāya admits a distinct absence called 'generic absence', i.e. absence of fire as a class differentiated from its specific absences. In the inference in point such generic absence of fire would never be observed in the locus of smoke. In generic absence the counterpositiveness is limited only by its class-character, viz. fireness, whereas in a specific absence, viz., in mountain fire, by mountainness and fireness both. Due to this difference in the nature of limitors the two absences differ. Generic absence is not a 'logical product' of specific absence but a distinct type of absence.

Now about the doubt 'Is there a colour in air or not' or 'Is air a locus of colour or not', Gaṅgeśa does not add any reason why such doubt exists. Vāsudeva clearly states that the existence of such doubt is admitted on all hands and a fact cannot be ignored so easily. But Vāsudeva does not see eye to eye with the argument of his predecessor Yajñapati, the founder of Mithila school of Navyanyāya, in rejecting the theory of *viśeṣābhāvavādin*, who holds that generic absence is nothing but a combination of specific absences. Yajñapati argues that if generic absence were the logical product of specific absences, we should have the cognition of generic absence of colour in two pots apprehending simultaneously. To be precise, suppose I see two pots on the table, one red, the other blue. Now the two pots have mutually the absence of each colour; in other words, both the pots have specific absences of colour. But for that none would say that both the pots jointly have generic absence of colour. Hence generic absence is not determined by specific absence.

Vāsudeva argues : Two pots jointly are not different from individual pots of which duality consists. And each individual

pot is not the locus of all specific absences of colour. And hence all specific absences of colour do not exist in the two pots taken jointly. An attribute not occurring in particulars cannot occur in the group of those particulars (*pratyekāvṛttidharmasya militāvṛttitvāt*, Vās. fol 36.2). Hence the question why the two pots taken jointly should not have generic absence of colour, does not arise.

Vāsudeva's admission of a distinct generic absence is based on the wellknown criterion of logical simplicity (*lāghava*). Vāsudeva argues that specific absence of colour are empirical facts (*kṛpta*) and hence by assuming a generic absence distinguished from such specific absences one runs the risk of logical complexity; on the other hand, specific absences are innumerable in number and to assume that all counterpositives of specific absences of colour are limited by one class-character 'colourness', would involve more complications (*gaurava*). Although the theory of a distinct generic absence is more involved, it is less complicated in the sense that in this view we shall have to assume only one absence of which the counterpositiveness is limited by the class-character 'colourness'. Thus Vāsudeva appeals to the criterion of simplicity in proving generic absence as distinct from the combination of specific absences.

SECTION TWO



CHAPTER IV

RAGHUNĀTHA ŚĪROMAṆI ON *Vyāptipañcaka*

Raghunātha Śīromaṇi stands at a period of transition in the history of Navyanyāya. With him the period of earlier commentators on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa came to an end and then commenced a period marked by a new style of presentation, new terminology and above all formal linguistic approach to epistemological and metaphysical problems. Although Raghunātha is looked upon as the most outstanding of all commentators on *TC*, yet a study of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti* reveals that during the period between Gaṅgeśa and Raghunātha a number of logicians flourished, who contributed a great deal to the evolution of Navyanyāya.¹ In this connection mention may be made of the names of Yajñapati Upādhyāya Jayadeva Miśra, Narahari Upādhyāya, Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and Rucidatta Upādhyāya. For a critical study of *TC* in its historical perspective these commentaries are of little help. For, in course of time new thoughts have crept in and new methodology has been introduced. As a matter of fact these commentaries may well be regarded as independent works rather than as commentaries. Although Raghunātha followed the same track in other sections of his *magnum opus TC. dīdhiti*, he appears as a faithful commentator in the section of 'five-fold definition of universal concomitance' (*Vyāptipañcaka*).

The section called *Vyāptipañcaka* contains five definitions of *vyāpti* prevalent during Gaṅgeśa's period. These definitions are nothing but different interpretations of 'non-deviation' (*avyabhicaritvatva*) recorded and finally rejected by Gaṅgeśa on

1. cf. E. Frauwallner, *Raghunātha Śīromaṇi* (Wiener Zeitschrift fuer die Kunde Sued-und Ostasiens. Vol. X, 1966).

the ground that all these definitions fail in the case of universal positive reason (*kevalānvayī hetu*). At the present state of our knowledge it is very difficult to identify the source of these five definitions as most of the works on Navyanyāya of the pre-Gaṅgeśa period have either been lost or not yet been published. It is worth mentioning that the commentators of *TC*. before Raghunātha have not seriously endeavoured to interpret these definitions in details. Yajñapati, Jayadeva, Vāsudeva and Rucidatta have left only a few occasional remarks. This may be due to the fact that perhaps they did not think it worthwhile to bring out a detailed comment on these definitions, since these definitions met with Gaṅgeśa's disapproval. With Raghunātha, however, the case is totally different. Unlike the general attitude amongst commentators Raghunātha here deals with the problem as a faithful commentator and makes no attempt to introduce any new thought and ascribe them to the original author.

The reason why Raghunātha unlike his predecessors devoted much attention to the section on *Vyāptipañcaka* and explained them with utmost clarity, possibly lies in the art that he adopted in commenting on them. Historically looking at the situation it seems that these definitions were surely associated with the names of individual logicians perhaps belonging to the same group of thinkers. But Raghunātha thought that these five definitions form a series in which the latter is a positive improvement on the former, since the defects of the former could well be avoided by the latter. Thus Raghunātha came to be regarded as a founder of the tradition that *Vyāptipañcaka* in later period gained so much popularity so that it is still looked upon as an introduction to the study of Navyanyāya.

Our immediate concern will be to analyse these definitions and bring out the ideas and techniques used by Raghunātha in interpreting them. Attempt will also be made to point out wherein Raghunātha deviates from his predecessors.

The first definition of non-deviation (= pervasion) recorded by Gaṅgeśa is as follows : '(Pervasion is) the non-occurrence in the locus of the absence of the probandum' (*sādhyaḥbhāvadavṛttitvam TC.*, p. 77,3-4). Now a problem has been raised with regard to this definition, viz, it does not include cases of incomplete occurrence (*avyāpyavṛtti*). The oft-quoted example

is : 'This (tree is in contact with monkey, for it is a tree' (*kapisamyogī etadvṛkṣatvāt*). Now conjunction (*saṁyoga*) in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is a quality (*guṇa*) of incomplete occurrence and as such the tree can turn out to be the locus of conjunction with monkey so far as the branches are concerned, but at the same time it serves as the locus of the absence of contact when its root is taken into consideration. Thus the probans (= this-treeness) occurs in the tree, which in its turn can very well be regarded as locus of the absence of probandum. Hence the definition does not apply to such valid cases of inference.

Raghunātha thinks that the aforesaid difficulty occurring in the first definition can be solved by introducing the second definition and for that purpose he interprets the second definition in his own peculiar way. This definition runs as follows : '(Pervasion is) the non-occurrence in the locus of the absence of probandum, which (i.e. the locus) differs from that which the probandum possesses' (*sādhyaavadbhinnasādhyaābhāvavadavṛttivam*. TC., p 77, 4). Raghunātha wants to interpret the first part of the definition, i.e., *sādhyaavadbhinna*, as qualifying the absence of the probandum. Or, in other words, the definition demands that the probans should not occur in a locus of such an absence of probandum which subsist in another locus from that of the probandum.

Such a formulation of the definition is applicable to cases of incomplete occurrence. In the inference cited above although the probans (=treeness) occurs in the locus of the absence of probandum (= tree), yet such absence is not one that subsists in a locus different from that of the probandum, since in such cases of incomplete occurrence probandum and its absence co-exist in the same locus.

The reason why Raghunātha interprets the definition in such a peculiar way lies in the fact that he wants here to avoid a difficulty raised by Vāsudeva,¹ his teacher. A study on

1. cf. also Kṛṣṇadāsa, *Anumānadīdhitiprasārīnī*, p. 40, 17 and D.C. Bhattacharya, *Vāṅmālī Sārasvat Avadān*, *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 38.

A characteristic feature of Raghunātha's writings is that he never mentions his predecessors by name, where he either refers to their

Vāsudeva's commentary on *TC*. (Ms. no. Sanskrit, 185, Saraswati Bhavan Library, Benares) reveals that Vāsudeva finds fault with the second definition, if its only object were to make the definition applicable to such cases of inference where the probandum is of incomplete occurrence. For, he thinks, that the definition could well serve such purpose without the term 'absence of probandum'. It seems that Vāsudeva had in his mind the interpretation of the definition as he got it from tradition (not of course from Yājñapati) which considers the first part of the definition, viz, *sādhyavadbhinna*, as qualifying the locus in which the absence of the probandum occurs. Vāsudeva is absolutely silent on the problem as to how the charge of superfluity occurs. He only remarks that as the term *sādhyābhāva* is superfluous the second definition should be rejected. The commentators on *Dīdhiti*, however, are eloquent in providing us with a satisfactory explanation of superfluity which they ascribe to Vāsudeva. They think that according to Vāsudeva mutual negation (*anyonyābhāva* = *bheda*) is of the nature of complete occurrence and as such when anywhere *sādhyābhāva* occurs, it follows automatically that it is different from that in which the probandum occurs. Conversely, if anything is different from that in which the probandum occurs, it follows that in the same locus the absence of the probandum occurs and hence the superfluity of the term *sādhyābhāva* becomes evident. Raghunātha, however, proceeds in a different direction in the sense that in order to avoid the charge of superfluity of the term *sādhyābhāva* he takes the first part of the definition as qualifying *sādhyābhāva* and not *sādhyābhāvavat*. And as such he had to seek for another reason for the introduction of the third definition.

Now Raghunātha points out the necessity of introducing the third definition. The definition runs thus : '(Pervasion is) not-having a common locus with a mutual absence which has the

views or refutes them, nor does he take pain to elucidate the viewpoints of his opponents; on the other hand he rejects them without advancing any systematic reason in his favour, and as such it becomes sometimes difficult from his texts to differentiate his own views from those of his opponents. Students of Navyanyāya will have to face this difficulty in forming a concrete idea of Raghunātha's contribution to the history of thought, unless texts on Navyanyāya during the period between Gaṅgeśa and Raghunātha are published.

locus of the probandum as its counterpositive' (*sādhya-
pratiyogikānyonyābhāvāsāmānādhikaranyam*. TC, p. 77, 4-79, 1). Raghunātha interprets this definition from a completely different metaphysical outlook. The second and the third definitions have been formulated from the same angle of vision, i.e., to say, in order to make the definition applicable to cases of incomplete occurrence. But the difference lies in the fact that while the former, so thinks Raghunātha, is based on the assumption that absences differ as their loci differ. Otherwise referring to the example discussed in connection with the second definition one may charge that there is only one absence of contact which occurs in substance as well as in quality (as quality does not occur in another quality). The result would have been that the probans would occur in a locus of the absence of probandum. In order to steer clear of this difficulty one should admit that the propounders of the second definition had the implicit sanction of the theory that absences differ as their loci differ.

Raghunātha thinks that the third definition emanated from that school of thinkers who did not admit that diversity of absence is determined by the difference in their loci¹, for to them the second definition is fallacious. The third definition as it stands is rooted on mutual absence. Raghunātha does not explain it and leaves it aside after indicating in short the necessity of its insertion.

The interpretation of the fourth definition as presented by Raghunātha justifies his claim to be a faithful commentator. He points out the weakness in the third definition. We have seen that the third definition is rooted on mutual absence. Now it is possible that loci of the probandum are many and as such one locus differs from the other. Or, in other words, mutual absence of one locus occurs in another, where in its turn the probans occurs. To illustrate: In the well-known case of inference of the occurrence of fire from smoke, the hill-top is *sādhya*; the kitchen, which is also *sādhya* serves as the locus of the mutual absence of hill-top; smoke also occurs in the kitchen. This fact turns the entire definition faulty of non-

1. A reference to this theory occurs in Gaṅgeśa's TC., cf: *adhikarāṇa-
bhedanābhāvabhedābhāvāt*, p. 178, 2-3).

pervasion. And herein lies, so says Raghunātha, the necessity of introduction of the fourth definition.

The fourth definition is as follows : '(Pervasion is) the counterpositiveness of the absence which occurs in all loci of the absence of probandum' (*sakalasādhyābhāvavanniṣṭhābhāvā-pratīyogitvam*. TC., p. 79, 1-82, 1). Evidently Raghunātha brings here into consideration all individual instances in their entirety and considers them individually. The term *sakala* (all) is replaced through *avacchedakatva*. Totality is to be understood with regard to both the probandum and the loci of the absence of probandum.

The reason why Raghunātha takes all loci of the absence of the probandum into consideration is to be found in the fact that otherwise the definition would be too wide as to pervade a false reasoning. For in the invalid inference : "It possesses smoke because of fire", the lake can easily be considered as one of the loci of the absence of probandum (i.e., smoke), where fire does not occur. Or, in other words, fire would be the counterpositive (*pratīyogī*) of the absence which occurs in a locus of the absence of probandum. With a view to cure this fault of overpervasion all individual instances of the absence of probandum should be reviewed. In that case, however, red-hot iron-ball, wherein the probandum is conspicuous by its absence comes in picture. The probans, i.e. fire, occurs in such a locus and as such it cannot be considered as a counterpositive. This situation runs counter to the desiderata of the definition and hence the charge of overpervasion does not stand scrutiny.

The term 'totality' should also be understood as qualifying the probandum, otherwise the definition would be too narrow in case of a valid inference, i.e., where fire is to be inferred from smoke. Since one can take any positive instance (*sapakṣa*) into account and aver that kitchen-fire is absent on the hill-top, so much so fire-in-the yard is absent in the kitchen. In this way each and every positive instance would turn out to be the locus of the absence of probandum, where the probans occurs. This would ultimately lead to the charge of non-pervasion. If, on the other hand, we take all positive instances in their entirety without any specification, all positive instances are excluded, i.e. to say, they cannot be taken as loci of the absence

of probandum. Then and then only such negative instance, e.g. lake, could be considered. Here, however, the probans does not occur, a fact which fulfils the requirements of the definition.

The main problem which centres round the whole set of definitions is to see whether they include cases of incomplete occurrence. With this aim in view Gaṅgeśa in his final definition of pervasion (*siddhāntalakṣaṇa*) makes an insertion to characterise the absence, which stands as the central figure in the structure of the definition. In order to render the definition acceptable Gaṅgeśa specifies it as an absence whose locus intrinsically differs from that of its counterpositive (*pratiyogya-samānādhikaraṇa*). Following his footsteps Raghunātha also specifies the absence, which occurs twice, as 'having a locus other than that of its counterpositive'. It should also be here noticed that up till now the discussion centred round the problem of incomplete occurrence or otherwise of the probandum in an inference. The question was not hitherto raised about the nature of occurrence with regard to the probans. Raghunātha points out for the first time, and indeed in course of his elucidation of the fourth definition, that the question of non-pervasion would occur only in case of incomplete occurrence of the probandum and complete occurrence of the probans. He possibly thought it logical to specify the nature of occurrence of the probans for the simple reason that the fourth definition requires the probans to stand as the counterpositive. If however the probans would have been of incomplete occurrence, probans and its absence would have shared the same locus, so much so the probans would have been automatically counterpositive of the absence ruling out the charge of non-pervasion in the definition altogether.

Raghunātha then endeavours to point out the necessity of qualifying the absence attached to the probans which occurs in connection with the probans, otherwise the definition would apply to an invalid inference, of which the probans is of incomplete occurrence. To illustrate: The inference, 'this is earth, because it is in contact with monkey', is obviously false as contact may occur not only in earth but in all other substances. Here for obvious reason incomplete occurrence

of the probans only has been taken into consideration for the probans would thereby automatically turn out to be the counterpositive. And as such the inference would apply to such a false inference. In order to obviate this difficulty Raghunātha inserts an attribute to the absence of the probans, viz., the probans should be the counterpositive of such an absence, which does not share the same locus with its counterpositive. Thus we are constrained to exclude the absence of probans.

Raghunātha now wants to specify the counterpositive, with which the absence of the probans must not share the same locus. For this purpose he introduces here the concept of *limitor*.¹ Raghunātha opines that the counterpositive should be limited by its own property so that the definition may be divested of the defect of non-pervasion. Take the example: "This is a substance since it inheres specified Existence" (i.e., "Existence as specified by the otherness of quality and activity"). It is logically a valid inference. But the inference has been advanced on the tacit assumption of the difference between the specified (*viśiṣṭa*) and non-specified (*śuddha*). But if this difference is not taken into account,² the absence of probans (i.e., the absence of specified Existence) subsisting in the locus of the absence of probandum

1. In his interpretation Raghunātha has changed the order of the absence. The absence of probans has been verbally mentioned, whereas that of the probandum has been signified through the term *api*. According to the definition the absence of the probandum should have been specified first. The reason for this change probably lies in the fact, as Bhavānanda and Jagadīśa point out, that in the next sentence Raghunātha categorically asserts that the probans should stand as the counterpositive. He further avers that the property of the counterpositive should coincide with that of the probans and indicates the absence of probans through the pronoun *tat*. The problem of counterpositiveness centres round the probans and as such the absence of probans is of prime importance. Had Raghunātha mentioned *sādhyābhāva* verbally in course of his specification of the counterpositive, he should have mentioned *hetvabhāva* also verbally in the next sentence, which would result in complexity. The reason does not seem very much strong to carry any conviction.
2. This is an interesting dictum often met with in Navyanyāya texts. Raghunātha also elsewhere seems to lend support to this view *na hi bhavati nilo ghaṭo ghaṭānyaḥ*. *TCd.*, p. 82, 7).

(i.e., in Quality) does not comply with the demand of the definition. In other words, it does not exist in a locus other than that of the counterpositive. Because the counterpositive would be according to this view 'the Existence (*Sattā*) which in its turn subsists in Quality, the locus of the absence of probans (i.e. specified Existence).' If, however, the mutual difference between the specified and non-specified is adhered to, specified Existence only transpires to be the counterpositive. This has Substance as its locus, where however the absence of probans (viz., specified Existence) does not occur, complying thereby with the requisites of the definition.

Raghunātha now points out the justifiability of introducing the fifth definition. With this objective he proceeds to reject the foregoing definition on the ground of its incompetency to include valid cases of inference. Now it has been made abundantly clear that the fourth definition demands the totality of all probandums and that of such instances where the absence of probandum occurs (i.e. totality of negative instances). It is evident that in order to make this definition more precise emphasis has been laid on the character of 'totality' (*sakalya*) and Raghunātha, in his eagerness to point out the defect in this definition makes capital out of this concept of 'totality'. 'Totality has been defined in terms of variety and non-remainder (*anekāśeṣa*, vgl. Yājñapati's comm. on *TC*, Fol. 13, 2 ; cf. also *Gādādhari*, p. 154, 1). If this device of defining 'totality' is accepted the definition would not apply to such cases where one unitary object is to be inferred. Thus this ontological situation is conspicuous by its absence in such valid cases of inference as '(It) possesses this (particular) colour, since (it) possesses this (particular) taste' (*etadrūpavān etadrasāt* — *Gādādhari*, p. 153, 29-154, 1). Here the inference refers to only one single instance of colour of which no concept of totality can be legitimately constructed and as such the definition turns out to be defective.

With regard to the totality of negative instances the same defect of pervasion can be detected. The definition would not apply to such valid reasoning where the negative instance is unitary in character. Take the inference : 'This is different from God, since it is a pot' (*Īśvarabhinnam ghaṭatvāt*,

Bhavānanda's comm on *TC.*, p. 108,6-7). Here the locus of absence of 'the difference from God' is the God Himself, who has been conceived of as One and Unitary. As such any attempt to form an idea of totality of negative instance would be futile.

The other presupposition in the definition is that the probans must not subsist in all loci of the absence of probandum. Here the concept of totality relates to the locus of the absence of probandum. But even then the definition may be charged of non-pervasion. To illustrate: '(This is) pervaded by the absence of smoke, since (here is) the absence of fire'. The probans is: the absence of fire. Consequently 'fire' is the absence of probans. The probandum is: that which is pervaded by the absence of smoke, for example 'water'. According to the demand of the definition the absence of the probans must exist in all loci of the absence of the probandum in their entirety. Take 'hill-top' as one of such loci. Now Raghunātha resorts to a peculiar device called *cālanī-nyāya*, through which any individual case of fire in due order may be considered as the absence of probans. If one takes 'kitchen-fire' the defect in the definition would be evident, since kitchen-fire is conspicuous by its absence on the hill-top and consequently absence of probans does not occur in all loci of the absence of the probandum in their entirety.

After pointing out the defect of non-pervasion Raghunātha interprets the fifth definition in which he simply states the explanation as offered by Vāsudeva. The definition runs as follows: '(Pervasion is) the non-occurrence in (a locus) other than that the probandum possesses' (*sādhyaavadanyāvṛttitvam*, *TC.*, p. 82,1). It is obvious from the above discussion that the foregoing definitions turn out to be defective only when individual cases of probandum are taken into account. The fourth definition, however, avoids this difficulty by introducing the concept of 'totality'. The definition under consideration may be equally charged of the same defect and as such at the outset it cannot be regarded as an improvement on the previous definitions. Raghunātha therefore brings in the concept of limiter (*avacchedaka*) and asserts that the counterpositive of the mutual negation should be determined by the generic attribute

of being the locus of probandum (*sādhya-vattvāvacchinna*).¹ Or, in other words, mutual negation, which forms a part of the definition, should be understood with regard to all loci of the probandum. The net result of this determination is that all individual instances, where the probandum subsists, would be automatically excluded. And as such any attempt to point out the defect in the definition by means of *cālanī-nyāya* would be thwarted. Hence Raghunātha considers this definition to be a positive improvement on the foregoing definitions.

1. *atrānyonyābhāvasya sādhya-vattvāvacchinna-pratīyogitākatvaṃ* [vyutpattibalalabhyam. TCd., p. 82, 67. Although by the term *vyutpatti* Gadādhara means conventional usage (*prāmāṇikavyavahāra*. Gād., p. 157, 31), still it is evident that Raghunātha here refers to Vāsudeva, (cf. *sādhya-vattvāvacchinna-pratīyogiko bheda iha vivakṣitaḥ*, fol. 16).

CHAPTER V

vyADHIKARAṆĀBHĀVA'—A TYPE OF NEGATION

The Concept of Universal Concomitance (*vyāpti*) in Navya-nyāya demands a reflection on a few interrelated concepts. The Naiyāyika in his attempt to present a definition of Universal Concomitance, free from all sorts of defect, makes use of such concepts and of these are the notion of negation and that of relation in their varied complex. It is our purpose here to analyse one such concept, called *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāva*, in its historical setting and to find out the exact contribution made by the Neologicians².

Gaṅgeśa (c. 1300—1360 A.D.) in the *vyāptipañcaka* and *simhavyāghra* sections of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (TC) rejects seven definitions³ of universal concomitance. These are negative

1. To be precise : *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāva*.
2. The writer is indebted to Professor Frauwallner for his illuminating analysis and edition of the relevant texts on this topic from manuscripts, vide WZKSO, Vol. X.
3. These are (i) *Sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam*. TC., p. 77, 3—4 ("Non-occurrence in the locus of the absence of the probandum"); (ii) *Sādhyavadbhinnasādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam*. TC., p. 77, 4 ("Non-occurrence in the locus of the absence of the probandum, which (i.e. the locus) differs from that which possesses the probandum"); (iii) *Sādhyavatpratiyogikānyonyābhāvāsāmānādhikaraṇyam*. TC. p. 77, 4—79, 1 ("Not having a common locus with a mutual absence which has the locus of the probandum as its counterpositive"); (iv) *Sakalasādhyābhāvavanniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitvam*. TC. p. 79, 1—82, 1 ("Counterpositiveness of the absence which occurs in all loci of the absence of the probandum"); (v) *Sādhyavadanyāvṛttitvam*. TC. p. 82, 1 ("Non-occurrence in a locus other than that the probandum possess"); (vi) *Sādhyasāmānādhikaraṇyānadhikaraṇatvam*. TC. p. 131, 1 ("Being no locus of (the property of) not having a common locus with the probandum"); (vii) *Sādhyavai-*

definitions formulated by his predecessors and based on the notion of non-deviation (*avyabhicaritatva*). The definitions involve the application of two negatives of 'what is sought to be proved' (*sādhya*) and of that 'by which something is proved' (*hetu*), e.g. non-occurrence of *h* in the locus of absence of *s* leads us to the assertion of non-deviation between the two. But these definitions, on analysis, transpire to be too narrow since they are not applicable to all cases of Universal Concomitance. In Nyāya ontology all real entities are knowable and nameable and hence knowability (*jñeyatva*) and nameability (*vācyaatva*) are everpresent properties (*kevalānvayināḥ*) characterizing everything whichever is real. Consequently non-occurrence of knowability would be unexampled (*aprasiddha*), since it has nothing to characterize. Now if *s* has an everpresent property like knowability as its value, the Naiyāyika has to face a serious difficulty in formulating a precise and faultless definition, if the definition contains two negatives.

Before Gaṅgeśa, attempts were however made to avoid the difficulty by positing a peculiar type of absence, i.e. the counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitā*) of which is delimited by a non-concurrent property (*vyadhikaraṇadharmā*). Ordinarily the counterpositiveness of an absence is delimited by a property which occurs in the same locus as the counterpositiveness itself. An example is: The case of cognition of absence like 'a pot is absent' may be interpreted in Navya-nyāya terminology as 'an absence of which the counterpositiveness is delimited by potness'. Now 'potness' is, on the other hand, the generic property by which the counter-positive is delimited. The cognition of absence is determined

vyadhikaraṇyānadhikaraṇatvam. TC, p. 131, 2 ("Not being the locus of (the property) differing in locus from the porbandum").

For a discussion on the first five definitions, traditionally known as *Vyāpti-pañcaka*, see by the present writer "Raghunātha Śiromaṇi on Vyāptipañcaka" *Anvikṣā* Vol. II, 1967, Jadavpur University Calcutta; Frauwallner, "Raghunātha Śiromaṇi," *WZKS* X 1966, pp. 86-207.

The definitions (vi) & (vii) are traditionally known as *simhavyāghra* (lion-tiger) definitions. For a discussion see Goekoop: *The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacināmāṇi* (D. Reidel Co. Holland, 1967), pp. 64-67.

not only by its counterpositive but also by the property which delimits (*avacchedaka*) the counterpositiveness.¹ In the above illustration the delimiting property of counterpositiveness occurs in concurrence with the counterpositiveness itself.

But a different type of absence was advocated by Sondala² and his followers. This is illustrated as 'A pot delimited by clothness is absent here'. To put it in Navyanyāya language : Here counterpositiveness occurs in pot, but on the other hand, the delimiting property of the counterpositiveness (i.e. clothness) does not occur in pot. Hence clothness is a property non-concurrent with the counterpositiveness. It is obvious that this type of absence is universally existent³, i.e. everything would be the locus of absence of 'pot delimited by clothness', even the locus where a pot exists. Those logicians who want to avoid the charge of non-applicability of the definition of universal concomitance, if such concomitance exists between two everpresent properties, seek the services of such an absence. It is argued : 'nameability' exists nowhere through inherence (*samavāya*), rather it occurs through selflinking (*svarūpa*) relation, or, in other words, nameability being limited by the property of being inherent exists nowhere and as such negative instance is available, in case concomitance between two everpresent properties is sought to be established. This concept of absence points out that there are two types of counterpositiveness—one limited by a concurrent property and the other by a nonconcurrent property.

The followers of Sondala anticipate a possible objection against this theory : If any entity can be regarded as a locus

1. Vide : *tadviśiṣṭajñānasyābhāvadhīhetutvāt*. TC., p. 145, 8 ("for, it is the knowledge of the counterpositive qualified by this (i. e. limiter of the counterpositiveness) that gives rise to the notion of absence").
2. Sondala or Sondaḍa or Saundaḍa was a pre-Gaṅgeśa writer on Logic (*mīmāṃsaka*?). He is known only by name from the reference to his views made by Gaṅgeśa, Vāsudeva and Vācaspati II, Vide D. C. Bhattacharya: *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā* pp. 14, 28, 39.
3. Vide : *Vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnaḥ pratyogitākābhāvasya kevalān-vayitvāt*. TC., p. 145. 2—3 ("For, an absence of which the counterpositiveness is limited by a non-concurrent property is ever-present"); cf. *saundālamatam avalambya. Gādādhari*, p. 145, 17 (ed. CSS).

of the absence of nameability determined by a non-concurrent property, then such an absence would also exist in a pot in which 'knowability' exists. This will amount to deviation, since non-deviation is defined as the non-occurrence of *h* in the locus of absence of *s*. Thus assertion of such a type of absence is open to the danger of containing an unexampled term and will vitiate all cases of valid concomitance.

Sondala, however, avers the difficulty by pointing out that such a paradoxical situation arises, because we do not take into consideration the absence, or more precisely, its counterpositiveness, or, rather, by which property the counterpositiveness is limited. In case of deviation one must specify the limiter of counterpositiveness. Occurrence of *h* in the locus of absence of *s* amounts to deviation. *s* is the counterpositive of *-s*. Now it is necessary that the limiter of counterpositive₁ and limiter of *s*₁ must be the same. When we say 'fire is absent in a lake' we take fire₁ as the limiter of counterpositiveness, which occurs in fire. Thus, that which characterises the fire as *s* must also be the limiter of its counterpositiveness, i.e. absence of *s* in its own nature should be understood, and that is to be asserted as a case of deviation if and only if *h* occurs in a locus of such an absence of *s*. And on this assumption Sondala avoids the charge of deviation. He points out that even if 'nameability' limited by a non-concurrent property is absent in a pot, in which however 'knowability' occurs, this would not necessarily frustrate all cases of logical concomitance since such a non-concurrent property, delimiting the counterpositiveness in 'nameability' is not identical with the limiter of *s*, i.e. limiter of *s*₁ is not the limiter of counterpositive₁.¹

But still, urges Gaṅgeśa, there is no progress. If we try to fit in this specification of absence of *s*, Sondala's attempt to justify cases of concomitance between two everpresent properties is falsified. When Sondala takes into account the absence of everpresent properties he certainly seeks the services of a

1. *Na caivam ghaṭa eva vyabhicāraḥ, sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinna-pratīyogitākasādhyābhāvavadvṛttitvaṃ hi vyabhicāraḥ. Na ca vācya-tvābhāvastādṛśo ghaṭe.* TC., p. 145, 3—6 ("There will be no deviation in pot, for deviation is the occurrence in a locus of that absence of the probandum, of which (i. e. absence) the counterpositiveness is limited by the limiter of probandumhood. Such an absence of nameability does not (exist) in a pot").

non-concurrent property, i.e., a property which is not identical with the limiter of s_1 . Thus accepting Sondala's own specification, it would be well-nigh impossible to assert such an absence of nameability, for, such an absence would stand on a par with the property of being a rabbit's horn. Gaṅgeśa realises this inconsistency involved in Sondala's position and categorically rejects the possibility of such an absence.

The controversy between Sondala and Gaṅgeśa on this issue may be checked by following the method involved in the denial of self-contradictory terms or determining the logical status of 'denoting phrases' that denote nothing. For example: 'the present king of France does not exist'. These are all phrases which do not denote anything or rather they denote 'null class'. This is same as Gaṅgeśa exemplifies 'rabbit's horn does not exist'. Sondala would perhaps explain the above example as 'The King of France as limited by presentness is absent'. But this, as Gaṅgeśa thinks, is susceptible to formal refutation. Gaṅgeśa would rather avoid the breach of law of contradiction by analysing and precisely determining the formal counterpositive of absence, i.e., 'the property of presentness is absent in the King of France'. In this case what is being negated (i.e. presentness) does not denote a null class, but can be exemplified in reality subsisting in every entity belonging to the present time.

While rejecting Sondala Gaṅgeśa, following the Navyanyāya tradition, wants to make the definition of pervasion universal in character. In this attempt it should be specified that all loci of absence of s are loci of absence of h , if the pervasion between s and h is meant. The Navyanyāya maintains the generality of statements by positing limitorship. To express 'the absence of pot' the Navyanyāya would use the corresponding relational abstract as limitor and say that 'absence of h , the counterpositiveness of which is limited by potness'. This amounts to the absence of pot as such. Furthermore, cognition of negation is dependent on the qualificative (*viśiṣṭa*) cognition of the negatum. Assertion or denial of existence in a locus of an entity, say h , is possible only when we have a qualificative cognition of h . Non-qualificative cognition leads us nowhere, not to speak of denial. A cognition is said to be qualificative in character only when

its object is limited by its own generic attribute. Thus the cognition 'pot is absent' presupposes the qualificative cognition of pot, i. e. cognition of pot-limited-by-potness. Similarly, while speaking of absence of such properties as nameability a concurrent property must have to be accepted as limiter, since a non-concurrent property does not possess that efficiency¹.

An analysis of the commentaries on Gaṅgeśa's TC shows that the followers of Sondala had initiated a long tradition on Sondala's theory which can be reconstructed by an analysis of the texts of the commentators of Gaṅgeśa, e. g., Yajñapati (C. 1410—1470 A. D.), Jayadeva (C. 1430—1490 A. D.), Rucidatta (C. 1450—1510 A.D.) and Vāsudeva (C. 1430—1540 A.D.), who have recorded the arguments advanced for and against Sondala's theory.

To come to Yajñapati: Anticipating Gaṅgeśa's objection that a non-concurrent property can on no account serve as a delimitor of counterpositiveness, the followers of Sondala suggested two different ways of solving the problem. They assert that although such a qualificative cognition of the counterpositive takes into account a non-concurrent property as its qualifier, it may very well be regarded as a case of error or a false cognition. This erroneous character of the cognition of the counterpositive does in no way affect the ascertainment of its absence. What is wanted is the qualificative cognition of the counterpositive, which is presupposed in the cognition of its absence. It is not our look-out whether the cognition of the counterpositive is by itself a valid or invalid one. It is an appeal to the criterion of simplicity (*lāghava*) through which the opponent claims victory. But this assertion of the opponent has further been justified by another epistemological reason. It is a fact that the cognition of absence emerges in the wake of a qualificative cognition. One thing is clear that the concept of absence is absolutely dependent on the qualificative character of

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1. *Pratīyogyavṛttiś ca dharmo na pratīyogitāvacedakaḥ, tadviśiṣṭajñā-syābhāvadhīhetutvāt.* TC., p. 145, 7—8. ("A property non-existing in the counterpositive cannot be the limiter of the counterpositiveness. For, it is the knowledge (of the counterpositive) qualified by this (i. e. the limiter of the counterpositiveness) that gives rise to the notion of absence").

the counterpositive, be such a qualificative cognition of the counterpositive true or false¹.

But a further objection has been anticipated by the opponent and recorded by Rucidatta. It is clear from Rucidatta's statement that the followers of Sondala share the same view with the Naiyāyika with regard to the nature of false cognition, i.e. *anyathākhyāti*. But the admission of absence of self-contradictory terms would evidently involve one to the assumption of the possibility of cognition of unreal entities (*asatkhyāti*), in defiance of the theory of error accepted by the opponent. But the opponent rules out the objection by positing that his concept of 'counterpositive' agrees with that of Gaṅgeśa as outlined above. Thus, in the illustration cited above 'nameability' is declared as a counterpositive, which has certainly an objective reference. Thus 'King of France' is the counterpositive whereas 'presentness' is its qualifier and hence the situation is saved.

A fresh question has been raised by Yajñapati. The opponent wants to explain the possibility of cognition of counterpositive by positing it as a case of false cognition. But such an assumption would not serve his purpose. The main objective of the opponent is to see such a type of absence as an everpresent property. The cognition 'Nameability determined by Inherentness is absent in a pot' presupposes a universal assertion 'Nameability determined by Inherentness exists nowhere'. But if such a cognition of *vyadhikaraṇābhāva* is dependent on the erroneous cognition of the counterpositive, as the opponent has anticipated, cognition of such an absence would be temporally limited, i.e. to say, where erroneous cognition of the counterpositive arises only there would arise the notion of such an absence, a position which runs counter to the fundamental assumption of the opponent that **such an absence is everpresent**².

1. *nanu pratiyogini tadvyrttidharmavaiśiṣṭyajāñānaṁ bhramarūpaṁ sambhavaty eveti*. Yaj. § 2 ("Well, the notion of being qualified by a property which does not exist in that (i.e. counterpositive) may well be of the nature of an error").
2. *Na vyadhikaraṇadharmāvaccinnapratiyogitākābhāvavādināḥ tannirūpaṇe tasyādaraḥ*. *Vācyatvaṁ na kvacit samavetam iti viśeṣadarśane satyeva vācyatvaṁ samavāyitayā ghaṭe nāstīti pratītes tenābhyupagamāt. anyathā tādṛśābhāvasya kevalānvayitvagrahasambhavāt*.

A large part of the argument in favour of *vyadhikaraṇābhāva*, as stated by its advocates, consists in a polemic resulting from a consideration of the proposition 'Rabbit's horn does not occur in a cow'. It is plain that such propositions do not become nonsense simply by asserting that it contains a term which has no denotation. Sondala would however argue that 'horn' is not an empty term, since it qualifies cow and other animals. But when it is qualified by a non-concurrent property, viz, relating to rabbit, its absence becomes everpresent. This procedure turns it to a denotor of null-class. Thus the only way, the opponent thinks, to explain such proposition as meaningful is to assert the possibility of an absence the counterpositiveness of which is delimited by a non-concurrent property¹.

Gaṅgeśa says practically nothing on the conflict with the law of contradiction that may occur. His attempt to avoid the breach of law of contradiction is characterised by over-simplicity and does not give an exact analysis of the problem. He avoids the assumption of *vyadhikaraṇābhāva* made by the opponent by simply changing the proposition 'rabbit's horn does not exist' as 'horn does not exist in a rabbit', i.e. by changing the character of the counterpositive altogether. It is plain that both horn and rabbit are not empty terms but can be exemplified in reality and hence Sondala's attempt stands rejected².

But Yajñapati's analysis of the problem and the reply thereof are characteristic of his logical acumen. His presentation is more systematic and hinges on the problem and seems to be more satisfactory to our intellectual desire. In his attempt

yatraiva vācyatvasya samavetavabhramas tasya tatraiva tena tadabhāvasattvagrahāt. Yaj. § 2.

1. *nanu gavi śaśaśṛṅgaṁ nāstīti pratīter anyathopapādayitum śakyatvād vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnaḥpratiyogitākābhāvaḥ kathaṁcid upapādanīyaḥ.* Yaj. § 4 ("But as the cognition 'Rabbit's horn does not occur in a cow' cannot be otherwise explained, the absence, the counterpositiveness of which is delimited by a non-concurrent property, is to be somehow asserted").
2. *gavi śaśaśṛṅgaṁ nāstīti pratīter aprasiddheḥ. Śaśaśṛṅgaṁ nāstīti ca śaśe śṛṅgābhāva ityarthah.* TC., p. 250, 16—18 ("Since such cognition as 'rabbit's horn does not occur in a cow' is unexampled. 'Rabbit's horn does not exist' 'means' the absence of horn in the rabbit").

to examine Sondala's theory Yajñapati observes that the cognition of the absence is determined by the superimposition (*āropa*) of the relation of counterpositive with the locus on which the absence is posited. This epistemic process is involved in every cognition of negation. Thus the cognition of the absence of books on the table presupposes a psychological process in which the relation of the book on the table is superimposed. This fact of superimposition becomes evident in such expressions : 'Had there been a book on the table it would have been immediately present to me'. Yajñapati makes capital out of this fundamental assumption. He thinks that such a supposition, on Sondala's theory, is improbable. The possibility of superimposition of horn in a cow is at the outset eliminated, as horn exists in a cow. The question of superimposition of horn 'qualified by its relation with rabbit' (*śaśīyatvaviśiṣṭa*) does not arise at all, since such a horn is unreal and as such the question of superimposition of its relation to a locus is eliminated. Superimposition involves remembrance of the object experienced in the past, it is co-occurent with an 'idea' of the past event. On Sondala's theory it becomes impossible to account for this obvious reference to the past and, consequently, the possibility of its superimposition in the present moment stands eliminated¹.

Another difficulty in Sondala's theory, thinks Yajñapati, is that it violates the condition of fitness (*yogyatā*) involved in the cognition of negation. Cognition of absence is not determined merely by the non-apprehension of its counterpositive, but the counterpositive must also be fit to be apprehended (*yogya*). By *yogyatā* Yajñapati means the causal factor (*sāmagrī*) for apprehension. In case of hypothetical apprehension of the absence of rabbit's horn, such conditions are defective, as the

13. *adhikaraṇe pratiyogisaṃsargāropapūrvikaiva saṃsarganiṣedhapratītir apekṣyate. na ca gavi śṛṅgasaṃsargāropaḥ sambhavati, tatra tasya sattvād eva. tathā ca katham tatra śṛṅgābhāvaḥ pratiyeta. Na ca śaśīyatvaviśiṣṭaśṛṅgaṃ tatra asad eva, tathā ca tādrśaśṛṅgasaṃsargāropas tatra syād eveti vācyam, tasyātyantāsattvena tatsaṃsargāropasyāsambhavāt. Yaj. § 4.* ('The cognition of absence of relation presupposes the superimposition of the relation of the counterpositive on the locus. And the superimposition of the relation of horn is not possible on the cow, since that (i. e. horn).

rabbit's horn has an unreal denotatum. Thus, the possibility of cognition of absence of a rabbit's horn is ruled out. And any cognition based on defective condition loses all practical value and as such it cannot account for the cognition of absence. Thus no cognition of such an absence occurs¹.

Rucidatta's treatment of the theory is more exhaustive than that of Yajñapati. He brings in all details particularly with regard to opponent's standpoint. In presenting his predecessors' arguments he is absolutely faithful. Sometimes he quotes them verbally, a method rarely followed by the commentators in Navyanyāya circle. He records the reply of the followers of Sodalā on the charges advanced by Yajñapati. We have seen that Yajñapati makes his case mainly on two points—the problem of superimposition and that of competency. The opponent, however, makes no scruple in denying the efficiency of *āropa*, but asserts that it is simple cognition of the relation of counterpositive, be such cognition true or false, that has to be presupposed in cognizing an absence. For example, I falsely cognize the absence of a pot where the pot is presented to me at this moment. In such a cognition of absence, you cannot say that it is due to the superimposition of the relation of pot,

exists there (i. e., cow). How is then the cognition of the absence of horn possible on that (i. e., cow)? Nor can it be said: The horn qualified by 'belonging to rabbit' is indeed non-existent there (i. e., cow). Hence there the superimposition of the relation of such a horn (i. e., qualified by 'belonging to rabbit') would be possible. Since it (i. e. *śaśāśṛṅga*) being absolutely unreal the superimposition of its relation would be an impossibility)." The same argument has been reproduced by Naraharī under *atra pīṭca-
raṇāḥ* etc. cf. *Dūṣaṇoddhāra*, folios 14-15.

1. *tādṛśapratīyogino yogyatāviśiṣṭasyaivānupalabdhir abhāvagrāhikā
vācyā, anyathātiprasaṅgāt. Yogyatā ca śaśīyatvāvachinnaśṛṅgasya
tadupalambhaka-sāmagrī vaktavyā. Yaj. 85 (= Nar. fol. 14 gavi
śaśīyatayā śṛṅgābhāvanīśayo nānupalabdhimātrād, atīndriyocchedāpa-
titeḥ kintu yogyānupalabdhyā. Yogyatā ca pratīyogītadvyāpyetarayāvat-
tadupalambhakarūpā etc.).* ("It should be said that non-apprehen-
sion of that counterpositive which is only qualified by the fitness
(i. e., of being cognised) is the determinant of its absence, otherwise
there would be overlapping. And fitness (in this case) is to be
said: those causal factors of apprehension of the horn limited by
rabbit-universal").

since the pot is actually present and as such the question of superimposition does not arise¹. On the question of competency, i. e. presence of all defectless causal factors of perception, the opponent replies that in the perception of such a type of negation admitted by Sondala, all causal factors are present. The sense-organs, such as eye etc., are conditions which are not defective, and thus cannot account for the cognition of absence of rabbit's horn. The opponent in fact does not accept non-cognition of cognisable entity as the ground for the perception of its absence, but asserts that the presence of which is contradictory to its non-cognition and the presence of horn delimited by its relation to rabbit (*śaśīyatvāvacchinna*) in the cow is contradictory to its non-cognition².

Rucidatta records another reply of the opponent to the objection raised by Yajñapati. On the question of superimposition Yajñapati points out that the opponent may seek to solve the question of *āropa* by assuming that 'being related to

1. Ruc. § 6, 4—7 ... *hetutvaṁ bhramapramāsādharaneṇa pratiyogisaṁsargajñānatvena, lāghavāt. anyathā ghaṭavati tadabhāvabhramānupapattau tadvatī tatsaṁsargajñānasyānāroparūpatvāt.*, ("Causality is through the knowledge of the relation of the counterpositive, common to error and truth, because of logical parsimony. Otherwise in a place having a pot the error 'there is no pot' cannot be explained, since in a place having that, the cognition of its relation is of the nature of non-superimposition").
2. Ruc. § 5, 8—15 *pratiyogyupalambhakasāmagryā doṣabhinnāyā avaśyaṁ vācyatvāt. anyathā pratiyogigrāhakadoṣabhāve ghaṭābhāvagraho'pi na syāt. tatsadbhāve tadanupalabdher eva abhāvāt. Naca prakṛte doṣabhinnā tadupalambhakasāmagrī nāstyeveti vācyam, cakṣurāder eva tathātvāt. ... api ca naiṣā योग्यānupalabdhir abhāvagrāhikā, kintu yatra hi yatsattvam anupalabdhivirodhūyādikā.* ("It should indeed be said that the causal factors of apprehension of the counterpositive must be other than faulty; otherwise if there is fault in the condition for apprehension of the counterpositive even the cognition of the absence of pot will not be possible. Since, in case of the existence of that there would be the absence of non-apprehension of that. It cannot also be said that in the present case faultless causal factors of the apprehension of that do not exist—since the eye, etc. are such (causal factors). Moreover non-apprehension of what is fit (to be cognised) is not the condition for the cognition of (its) absence, but that where the existence of which is contradictory to its non-apprehension etc.")

rabbit' (*śaśīyatva*) is superimposed on horn, and on this view the difficulty incurs, since both are real. But this does not turn out to be a happy solution. Since any cognition of absence based on such superimposition will be of the nature: 'The nature of being related to rabbit is absent in horn' and not as 'Rabbit's horn does not exist in a cow', as was the case under consideration. This charge of Yajñapati has been made clear by Rucidatta (§ 7) when he concentrates on the nature of delimitor of counterpositiveness in the point at issue. Thus in the cognition 'rabbit's horn does not exist in cow' if we are to accept the 'nature of being related to rabbit' as the delimitor of counterpositiveness, then the cognition would have been expressed as 'being related to rabbit is absent here' or to take the example 'presentness does not exist in the King of France'. The concept of absence is entirely determined by the delimitor of this abstract concept, i.e., counterpositiveness. When these limitors vary, the counterpositives also turn out to be different, resulting in the emergence of two distinct types of cognition of absence. Thus in the above illustrations in one case we cognize the counterpositive as 'relating to rabbit' (*śaśīya*), while in the other case as 'horn'. Thus the counterpositiveness in the former is limited by *śaśīyatva*, while in the latter by *śṛṅgatva* (hornhood). Now, hornhood cannot serve as the delimitor of counterpositiveness where horn is actually present, i.e. in a cow. X cannot occur in the locus where the absence of *h* is supposed to occur, consequently *h* cannot be regarded as a counterpositive, i.e. to say, *h*-hood as limitor of its counterpositiveness of the absence which occurs in the locus of *h*. The property 'rabbit's horn-hood' is obviously a fiction and as such fails to serve as the delimitor. Thus finally due to lack of determination of a delimitor such cognition of absence, viz., 'rabbit's horn does not occur in a cow' is meaningless¹.

1. *nanu atra yadi śaśīyaivam pratiyogitāvacchedakam, tadā 'śaśīyam iha nāstīti pratiyāpattiḥ. atha śṛṅgatvam, tad api na, tadavacchin-nasya gavi sattvena tadavacchinābhāvāsambhavāt. Śaśaśṛṅgaṁ cāprā-māṇikam iti tavāpi sammatam iti tādṛśapratītiḥ asiddhaiva iti cet - Ruc. 7. 1—4* ('Now here (i.e., in the cognition 'rabbit's horn does not exist in a cow') if the 'nature of belonging to rabbit' is held to be the limitor of counterpositiveness, then the objection of such cogniton as 'the nature of belonging to a rabbit' does not exist

The opponent however sticks to his own point that *śaṣīyatva* is the delimitor. He retorts that it is not a fact that in a counterpositive the delimitor of its counterpositiveness only is cognized but all other attributes are cognized in a counterpositive, if, of course, the causal factors of such cognition are present. Thus in the cognition 'The verifiable pot does not exist here', 'potness' is the delimitor of counterpositiveness of absence which is cognized alongwith the cognition of 'verifiability', although the latter does not enter into the cognition of absence as the delimitor of counterpositiveness¹. Hence even if *śaṣīyatva* is the delimitor, *śṛṅgātva* is still cognized and there is no reason why the cognition would have to be expressed as '*śaṣīyatva* does not occur here'.

Rucidatta next proceeds to criticise Sondala's concept and in his attack he goes on in a different way than Yajñapati. His trend of argument may be summarised as follows :—The notion of absence takes into consideration not only the counterpositive but also the locus or the subjunct (*adhikaraṇa*) on which the absence occurs. As both of them play an important part in the cognition of absence, the upholders of Sondala's position should be constrained to admit a different type of absence in case the subjuncthood is delimited by a non-concurrent property. Thus, in a cognition like 'potness does not occur in a pot limited by clothness' 'clothness' becomes the delimitor of locushood in pot and hence it is not concurrent with such locushood, i.e. potness. This will amount to accepting a different type of absence of

here' would arise. If, however, 'hornhood' (is accepted as the limitor), that is also not possible. Since, that (which is) delimited by that (i.e., hornhood) being presented in a cow, absence of anything delimited by that (i.e. hornhood) cannot occur (in a cow). And that 'rabbit's horn' is unproved is also admitted by you (i.e., followers of Sondala). Therefore, such cognition (e. g., 'rabbit's horn does not exist in a cow') is baseless").

1. "na hi partiyogitāvacchedakamātram eva pratiyogini bhāsate, 'prameyo ghaṭo nāsti' ity atra atādrśasyāpi prameyatvasya ghaṭe bhānāt." Ruc. § 7, 6—8 ("Not that only the delimitor of counterpositiveness is cognised in the counterpositive, since in such (cognition) as 'the verifiable pot does not exist', the verifiability which is not such (i. e. the delimitor of counterpositiveness) is also cognised in a pot").

which the adjuncthood is delimited by a property that does not occur in the same locus as the adjuncthood (*adhikaraṇatā*)—a position which runs counter to the accepted doctrine of the school.¹

Now let us turn to our reflections on the problem as posed and ultimately solved by Vāsudeva. The method which Vāsudeva adopted as his starting point provides us with a complete picture of his personality and understanding of the problem. He does not undermine Sondala's theory, but on the other hand presents it with all its niceties. He takes up for discussion fundamental concepts involved and we can have an actual picture of the conflict between the followers of Gaṅgeśa and Sondala in all its details. An analysis of Vāsudeva's text as presented by FRAUWALLNER² shows that it runs in three parts. Firstly, he reproduces Sondala's theory with all its ramifications and then its application in the formulation of *vyāpti* definition, a novel treatment to be found for the first time in Jayadeva. The last section is rooted on Gaṅgeśa's well-known example 'rabbit's horn does not exist in a cow.'

It is clear also from Vāsudeva's reference to Vardhamāna³ in the first part of his discussion that attempts to fit in Sondala's concept of the absence at issue with the definition of *vyāpti*, and to formulate a number of such definitions were made

1. "atra brūmaḥ : *Yadi gavi śaṣṭīyaṁ śṛgaṁ nāsti iti pratītyā vyadhikaraṇadharmāvachchinaapratiyogitākābhāvo*' bhyupeyaḥ, *tadā paṭat-vāvacchinme ghaṭe ghaṭatvaṁ nāsti iti pratītyā vyadhikaraṇadharmāvachchinmādhikaraṇatāko*' py atirikto 'bhāvo' bhyupeyaḥ syāt. na ceṣṭāpattih, *apasiddhāntāt.*" Ruc. § 8, 1—4.
2. See Frauwallner : Raghunātha Śīromaṇi, WZKSO, Bd. X (1966), pp. 180ff.
3. Cf. Vās. § 2 "*na ca Pramāṇaparakāṣe etaadvādimite*" *nusṛtaṁ sādhyābhāvasamānādhikaraṇa-yāvad-atyantābhāvapratiyogitvaṁ lakṣaṇam yuktam*" (— "The definition followed by the upholders of this view (noted) in the *Pramāṇaparakāṣa*, viz. 'The nature of being the counterpositive of all instances of constant absence which are concurrent with the absence of the probandum' is not tenable"). This is a reference to the *pramāṇa* section of the *Nyāyanibandha-prakāṣa* of Vardhamāna. D. C. Bhattacharya in his *Vaiṣeṇa Navanyāyacarā* (p. 272) says that this definition was also quoted by Raghunātha Vidyālaṁkāra in his *Dīdhiti-pratibimba* cf. *NVT-pariśuddhiprakāṣa* (BI. Edn) p. 582. cf. [also Frauwallner (WZKSO, X, p. 181).

before Vardhamāna and were taken into consideration by Jayadeva and Vāsudeva. Ultimately fundamental problems with regard to this absence were pushed into background, and formulation of definition based on such a type of absence occupied the field. Raghunātha's treatment is an illustration to the point. But apart from his innate aptitude towards formal niceties Raghunātha certainly follows a tradition, although he deviates to a great extent.

At the outset Vāsudeva in his presentation of opponent's arguments follows Yajñapati and Rucidatta. The old question whether the nature of the cognition of counterpositive, i.e. whether the cognition is true or false, should be considered in determining the cognition of its absence, has again been raised and the opponent's reply as before has been adduced. On the question of superimposition (*āropa*), the opponent categorically rejects the supposed efficacy of superimposition of the counterpositive in the cognition of its absence. He raises an interesting point. We observe destroying a pot (i.e., where we actually observe that the pot ceases to exist) and later on we can well observe the posterior absence of the pot¹. It is clear that here the notion of absence occurs in spite of the hypothetical superimposition. On the question of competency (*yogyatā*) of the counterpositive in the cognition of its absence Vāsudeva (§ 6) reports no afterthought on the part of the opponent but repeats the same as recorded by Rucidatta (§ 5).

Then Vāsudeva, refers to a critique against Sondala and finally rejects the same. The dispute here first centres on the following : The critic points out that the cognition of absence is determined by a) the non-cognition of the counterpositive, b) qualified by the delimitor of its counterpositiveness. Thus the counterpositive, the non-apprehension of which is a determinant in cognizing its absence, must be by itself qualified. Now one who erroneously cognizes 'whichever occurs in a pot occurs through inherence', cannot have such cognition as 'nameability qualified by inherenthood does not occur in a pot'. Second point raised by the critic relates to the concept of limitor. To

1. Vās. § 6. "Vinaśyadavasthaghaṭapramayopyuttarakālaṁ ghaṭadha-
vaṁsasākṣātkāradarśanena pratyogyāropasya niṣedhāvagamahetut-
vabhāvāc ca".

him, limitorship does not consist in being the cause of the notion of limitation (*avacchittipratyayajanaka*), since it leads to the fallacy of circularity known as self-dependence. He rather suggests that a limitor is not wider in extension than the entity limited and is itself a simple property (*laghudharma*). That means that the limitor must be exactly concurrent with the limited property. On this supposition a non-concurrent property (as in Sondala) cannot be the limitor of counterpositiveness¹.

With this we come to the end of Vāsudeva's presentation of the view-point of the followers of Sondala and their critics. Vāsudeva's treatment shows that he is more prone to present the views of Sondala and those of his critics. But he is almost silent about his say on this problem. His disciple Raghunātha has gone to the extreme. He neither records Sondala's standpoint in detail nor does he care to reject it. He follows a different track from his predecessors Yajñapati, Jayadeva, Rucidatta and Vāsudeva. In this section at the outset Raghunātha brings in a number of instances of this type of absence. Then he formulates two definitions of *vyāpti* (= *avyabhicaritatva*) and thereafter quotes with modifications the definitions of Śrīnātha Cakravartī, Pragalbha, Jayadeva, Vāsudeva and Kāśīnātha Vidyānivāsa. All these definitions seek to cover the cases of concomitance between two everpresent properties, of course, without the admission of *vyadhikaraṇābhāva*. After a long discourse on these definitions Raghunātha at the end comes to the point at issue and simply elucidates Gaṅgeśa's argument for rejecting such a type of absence and adds nothing new to the debate.

1. Vās. § 7. "Kiñcāvacchittipratyayajanakatvaṃ nāvaccedakatvaṃ, gauravāt, vyāptīlakṣaṇe ātmāśrayāpatteḥ, kintv anātīrīktaavṛttīlaghudharmatvaṃ, tathā ca pratiyogyavṛtter na pratiyogitāvaccchedakatvasambhavaḥ".

CHAPTER VI

RAGHUNĀTHA ŚĪROMAṆI ON SĀMĀNYALAKṢAṆĀ

In the history of Navyanyāya school of Indian Logic Raghunātha Śīromaṇi plays a prominent role. He may rightly be considered as the founder of Bengal school of Navyanyāya. The works of later commentators in Bengal are based on Raghunātha's magnum opus, the *Dīdhiti* commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Due to the overwhelming popularity of the *Dīdhiti* the works of his predecessors gradually faded into oblivion. It is therefore in the fitness of things that a thorough analysis should be undertaken in order to bring Raghunātha himself and his work into better light so that the creative trend of the period around him may be properly judged. It is Professor FRAUWALLNER who, on the basis of available text material, for the first time provided us with a scientific analysis of some sections of the *Dīdhiti* and made an assessment of the method adopted by Raghunātha, his personality and the positive contribution made by him in the realm of philosophical thinking¹. In this chapter an attempt has been made to continue the analysis of Prof. FRAUWALLNER. For that purpose we have selected the section on *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* of the *Dīdhiti* and it will be evident that the observations made by Prof. FRAUWALLNER are further corroborated by the results of our analysis.

The genesis of the concept of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* may be traced back to the period before Gaṅgeśa. To the Naiyāyika perception depends for its emergence upon sense-object contact. In ordinary cases of perceptual cognition the object perceived by a

1. E. FRAUWALLNER : *Raghunātha Śīromaṇi* (WZKSO X, 1966, pp. 86—207).

particular sense is always present to the corresponding sense-organ. But it is just possible that there may be cases of perception where the object to be perceived is not present to the senses. For example, when we see a cow we also perceive the cow-universal (*gotva*) inherent in it, which is immediately followed by the perception of all cow-individuals comprising the cow-universal. These particular cow-individuals include those that existed in the past and would come in future, those that lie close and those distantly removed. But such a perception is not possible by ordinary sense-object contact and herein the Neo-logician finds the necessity of admitting a super-normal sense-object contact, which he calls *sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti* (or *-sannikarṣa*). He asserts that when we perceive a particular cow-individual belonging to a class, we also simultaneously perceive the cow-universal inherent in it and the knowledge of this universal or the felt-universal serves as the contact conjoining the visual organ and all cow-individuals—past, present and future, far and near.

A study of Navyanyāya texts before Gaṅgeśa shows that the concept of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* owes its origin to the concept of *vyāpti* (universal concomitance). The chief argument for the admission of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* in the pre-Gaṅgeśa period concentrated itself with the possibility of inductive generalisation. The relation of universal concomitance subsists between all cases of the relata, for example, fire and smoke. But all cases of smoke and fire and their co-existence cannot be covered through our ordinary sense-perception. Herein the *sāmānyalakṣaṇāvādin* asserts that when we perceive a particular smoke and particular fire and their co-existence, their corresponding generic attributes, viz. fireness, smokeness, etc. are simultaneously perceived. And at the next moment through these perceptions or perceived universals all individuals comprising the class-character come to the content of our knowledge. This is the supernormal perception in which the universal or the knowledge of it serves as the relation (*pratyāsatti*) coalescing the two extremes—the sense-organ and the object, viz. all individuals. This is the argument which Śrīharṣa had before him and which did not find his favour. He does not indulge in any elaborate disquisition but simply avers that such an assumption would

involve omniscience. Śrīharṣa's mode of treatment is as follows : One may just know a thing as knowable and draw out a universal concomitance between knowability and objectivity, which would in its turn presuppose the knowledge of all knowables, a position tantamount to omniscience¹. Maṇikanṭha also rejects *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* and the pūrvaapakṣa presented by him covers the same ground as that of Śrīharṣa. It seems therefore that the problem of *vyāpti* originally formed the corner-stone initiating the Neo-logician in postulating *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. Maṇikanṭha however rejects this concept by an appeal to inference and avers that for the knowledge of all individuals the services of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* should not be necessarily requisitioned, but we can well consider it to be a case of inference, which is already an accredited means of knowledge².

Coming over to Gaṅgeśa we meet with a more concrete picture of the problem of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. In the *vyāptivāda*-section of TC Gaṅgeśa, after recording different traditional definitions of *vyāpti* and formulating that of his own, passes over to the problem of ascertainment of *vyāpti*. In the *vyāptigrahopāya* section he makes a passing reference to this concept (TC, p. 187, 2—5). This forms the basis of the *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* section. But an analysis of Gaṅgeśa's text shows that in course of arguments and counter-arguments new problems have emerged, for the satisfactory solution of which the services of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* have been requisitioned. Gaṅgeśa is elaborate in presenting the arguments of the opponents. In the pūrvaapakṣa section he brings the viewpoints of both the parties admitting and rejecting *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. At the outset he records the argument of the *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*-vadin, which coincides with the opponent argument brought forth by Śrīharṣa and Maṇikanṭha. But in addition he records another argument which seems to have emanated from some Neo-logicians of the pre-Gaṅgeśa period. Their mode of approach is as follows : It is an admitted fact that every synthetic knowledge (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) presupposes the previous knowledge of the determinant (*viśeṣaṇa*). The knowledge 'The

1. cf. KhKhKh, pp. 655—58.

2. NR, p. 64.

hill (is) possessed of 'fire' is evidently synthetic in character and 'fire' or more precisely 'fire-on-the-hill' serves as the determinant, and as such it must be previously known. But as 'fire-on-the-hill' can never be ordinarily known prior to the moment when the hill is actually perceived, one would be constrained to admit that wherever in a positive instance *vyāpti* is determined through the perception of probans and probandum all cases of probans and probandum are automatically perceived through the medium of their respective universals, which evidently justifies a case for *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. But all these arguments could not satisfy Gaṅgeśa and he seeks to justify *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* on the following grounds: Such cases of doubt as to 'whether all cases of smokes are cases of fire' always happen in the course of assertion of *vyāpti*. With regard to the observed cases of concomitance no difficulty arises, but doubt occurs with regard to all other cases of smoke and fire which lie beyond the range of our ordinary perception. Now, doubt presupposes that its object (*dharmin*) must be previously perceived. This fact demands the perception of all smokes, before any doubt is entertained as to its concomitance with fire. And herein Gaṅgeśa seeks the office of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

Let us now begin with Raghunātha. In our treatment of Gaṅgeśa it has been made abundantly clear that in order to establish *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* Gaṅgeśa banks upon the problem of emergence of doubt with regard to the universal concomitance, doubt which takes into account all individuals belonging to two groups of which the universal relation is predicated. And herein Raghunātha clinches the issue. By introducing an alternative he shows that the emergence of doubt stands in no way contradicted even if *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is not admitted. The entire section begins with *atra vadanti* ("here they say"), indicating thereby that Raghunātha records here what he got from his predecessors. And in fact the alternative advanced in this connection has its parallel referred to by Vāsudeva under *kecit* and rejected by Vāsudeva's preceptor¹. Raghunātha

1. Vāsudeva's commentary on TC p. 123 = TCd pp. 453, 9—454, 2. Reference is made of the only copy of a Vāsudeva manuscript preserved at the Saraswati Bhavan Library, Benares. References are according to the handwritten copy of the same preserved at the Indological Institute, Vienna.

is rarely eloquent about his own standpoint on a particular issue and often chooses to remain in the background¹. Now, the thinkers referred to above ask : Whether the universal concomitance is cognised in a smoke *qua* smokeness or in a particular case of smoke as determined by this smokeness ? or, in other words : Whether *vyāpti* subsists in any individual belonging to a class or in one definite individual. In case the former is accepted, *vyāpti* in all cases of smoke is cognised and as such there is no chance of any emergence of doubt. If however one sticks to the second alternative emergence of doubt stands in no way impeded. These thinkers evidently sought here the services of the implicit dictum viz., the assertion of *vyāpti* in a particular case does not counteract the emergence of doubt with regard to the same when taken as a class. To use the Navyanyāya technique: *viśeṣaṇiścaya* does not counteract *sāmānyasaṁśaya*, but rather the *viśeṣasaṁśaya*. Raghunātha makes the point explicit with the help of an illustration : Although it is a fact of our experience that colour inherent in earthly substance is necessarily pervaded by air-universal (*vāyutva*), still doubt persists as to whether colour as such is invariably determined by the absence of air-universal or not. Similarly in the case under consideration doubt may continue even if *vyāpti* between the two as characterised by their respective nature is cognised and as such the services of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* would serve no purpose.

Raghunātha then rejects a view which may reasonably be ascribed to Jayadeva². Raghunātha here also substantially changed Jayadeva's mode of presentation. Jayadeva makes capital out of the dictum that the knowledge of negation is invariably determined by the knowledge of the negatum. And for the knowledge of *sāmānyābhāva* (generic absence) the services of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* should be requisitioned.

Jayadeva asserts that darkness is the stage of conglomeration of all instances of absence of light and as such the perception of darkness should necessarily be determined by the knowledge of all instances of light which stand as the counterpositive

1. Cf. E. FRAUWALLNER : loc. cit. p. 135.

2. Jayadeva's *Āloka* Commentary on TC (Calcutta Sanskrit College, Mss. 2463) : *vayan tu sāmānyalakṣaṇaṁ vināṇḍhakārapratyāyānudayo-prasaṅgah ...* TCD p. 456, 3—5.

(*pratiyogin*). And herein for the knowledge of all instances of light the relation of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* must have to be admitted. It should be pointed out here that although Jayadeva does not mention darkness as a case of *sāmānyābhāva*, rather he says 'all individual absences in their entirety' (*yāvattejovirahavyakti*), Raghunātha while referring to the view of Jayadeva, brings in the question of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* with regard to the cognition of *sāmānyābhāva*. This points out that Raghunātha is not always faithful to his sources. He modifies them according to his own likes and dislikes.

Against Jayadeva Raghunātha's stand is as follows. It is not a fact that every case of cognition of absence is preceded by the knowledge of its counterpositive. What is wanted here is the knowledge of the attribute which stands as the determinant of counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitāvachedaka*). This determines the knowledge of the absence. If that is not admitted one would be constrained to admit that even in the case of the perception of absence of an entity, knowledge of all entities belonging to the same group would be an essential pre-requisite, a position which any sane man would hardly admit. Moreover, assuming darkness to be the absence of light, if however darkness is cognised simply as 'this is blue', i. e. to say, if its negative character is completely overlooked, then there would be no necessity of the prior knowledge of the counterpositive. This explains why in case darkness is perceived as such doubt occurs as to its exact nature, whether positive or negative, but when it is presented to us as an absence of light doubt does not occur. Raghunātha then avers that even if knowledge of the counterpositive be regarded as a necessary pre-requisite to the knowledge of absence, it may well be posited that the knowledge of any one of the counterpositive may serve that purpose. Otherwise, it will lead to logical complexity (*gaurava*). Here Raghunātha's reply is simply formal.

But in the next argument advanced by him Raghunātha's logical acumen is evident. The trend of discussion, as we have seen, centres round the problem whether the cognition of all or any one of the counterpositives serves as the determinant to the cognition of absence. In case of the former the purpose of the upholder of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* would be served. Therefore

Raghunātha dives deep into the problem. He further asserts : It is a fact of our experience that pre-negation (*prāgabhāva*), post-negation (*dhvaṃsābhāva*) and absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) are mutually contradictory to each other in the same way as they severally are contradictory to their respective counter-positives. As pre-negation is contradictory to post-negation the latter may well be regarded as the counterpositive of the former. And hence on that account in the knowledge of pre-negation its absolute negation should have been previously known—a position which is never testified by our experience. Hence, Raghunātha concludes that the assertion that all counter-positives must be known before the absence is known, stands unwarranted, and as such the admission of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* turns futile.

In this connection Raghunātha enters into another problem which has got indirect bearing on the problem of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. Unlike Jayadeva he does not regard darkness as a case of *yāvadviśeṣābhāva*, but to him it is a case of *sāmānyābhāva* of a peculiar type of light. All individual absence of light (obviously, pre-negation, post-negation etc.) cannot be accumulated under one group qualified with a common attribute, and as such it will lead to a regressus ad infinitum. Moreover, pre-negation of an entity manifests itself only in the collocation of all causes leading to the emergence of that entity. Now if darkness be the state of accumulation of all absence of light, then on Jayadeva's stand one shall have to admit that the knowledge of darkness must be preceded by the knowledge of collocation of all causes of light, an assumption which is on the face of it absurd. Thus the collocative nature of darkness as advocated by Jayadeva is refuted which serves as a vehement assault on the theory of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

The next section (TCd pp. 461, 2—486, 1) concerns primarily with the concept of pre-negation and Raghunātha with his characteristic lack of clarity jumbles up a number of accessory problems not directly linked up with the point at issue. Some one thinks that the office of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* should be sought in the perception of pre-negation. It is perceived only in the state of collocation of all conditions leading to the fructuation of the effect. In the perception of pre-negation the counter-

positive is presented through the supernormal contact called *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. None of Raghunātha's predecessors, viz., Yājñapati, Jayadeva, Vāsudeva or Rucidatta refers to it. In any case Raghunātha takes exception to the above view. He introduces the same concept of determinant universal and asserts that not the counterpositive but the generic attribute inherent in the counterpositive serves as the determinant to the perception of pre-negation.

Historically speaking three different stages of argumentation can here be detected. One holding the possibility of perception of pre-negation, the other admitting it to be a case of inference (TCd pp. 462, 2—463) and finally Raghunātha's observations on the issue. The *anumānavādin* thinks that if pre-negation is a case of inference the knowledge of the counterpositive stands as a part and parcel of the knowledge of the relation between the probans and the subject of the inference (*pakṣadharmatā*), which is the ground of all inference. The knowledge of this relation is determined by that of the probans as pervaded by the probandum. But for that the knowledge of the probandum is in no way a pre-requisite. And as such for the knowledge of the counterpositive (which is in this case a part of the probandum) services of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* should not be requisitioned.

Raghunātha reports a reply from the side of the *sāmānyalakṣaṇāvādin*. They retort that even if pre-negation is a case of inference it would serve no purpose of the opponent. For, inference presupposes perception of the probandum, without which *vyāpti*, a condition of inference, cannot be ascertained. Consequently, the old question of the knowledge of the counterpositive would arise, justifying thereby the assumption of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. Raghunātha's reply to these problems is tantamount to evasion. He brings nothing new but simply asserts that no clear concept of pre-negation can be ascertained, and in this connection introduces a lot of discussion on the exact significance of the term *bhaviṣyati* used in connection with the concept of pre-negation. Thereupon he determines the nature of *utpatti* (emergence). It is characteristic of Raghunātha that he often indulges in all such side problems without dilating much upon the view-points of the opponent or that of his own.

With this we come almost to the end of the problem of pre-negation vis-a-vis *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. With his characteristic

mode of presentation Raghunātha brings in as supplement two views as *pare* (TCd pp. 486, 1—487, 7) and *anye* (TCd p. 487, 1), which from the available materials it has not been possible for us to identify. But it is evident that these views originated in the circle of upholders of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, who made an attempt to find out new grounds for the assumption of pre-negation, nay its perceptual character and consequently *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

The thinkers referred to as *pare* (others) show considerable ingenuity in establishing the existence of pre-negation. Two points have been raised by them: Effect of incomplete occurrence (*avyāpyavṛtti*), say conjunction of a bird with the tree, does not further originate after its original production, although being of incomplete occurrence its absence occurs in another part of its locus. Secondly, indeterminate perception is followed by determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*), but why it is that at the next moment the same indeterminate perception does not again emerge into existence. The obvious reply would be that the pre-negation of conjunction and that of indeterminate perception do not still subsist and as such the corresponding effects do not originate.

The thinkers referred to as *anye* (others) argue that it is a fact of our experience that the concept of number 'three' emerges only where the concept of number 'two' has emerged, i.e. to say, only in the locus of its pre-negation. It does not occur with regard to objects emerging at different moments of time. This is a pointer to the fact that effects emerge into existence only in the locus of its pre-negation. Raghunātha simply records these views without saying a single word on any one of them.

Then Raghunātha proposes to reproduce and reject the viewpoint of Jayadeva. Jayadeva's statement on this point is too brief to draw out the exact significance of his contention, but Raghunātha's formulation of the same is marked with clarity and exactitude. Jayadeva asserts that without the admission of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* the causal nexus between knowledge, desire and volition cannot be established. Knowledge, leads to desire and desire leads to volition. Jayadeva here works with the accepted metaphysical doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika that two specific attributes of the self do not occur simultaneously. Accordingly,

when knowledge leads to desire at the next moment, it should be admitted that the perception of the primary knowledge occurs at the third moment. In that case however the causal nexus between primary knowledge and desire remains unestablished. For causal relation demands that the two relata between which causality is predicated should be perceived. Hence it becomes imperative that the primary knowledge is presented through knowledge-universal, which is evidently a case for *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. This is how Raghunātha interprets the implications of Jayadeva's argument. Raghunātha, however, finds fault with Jayadeva's position. He asserts that it is the relation of immediate antecedence and consequence (*paurvāpya*) which determines the two as causally related, and not merely the perception of the two on which Jayadeva banks. Moreover even if Jayadeva's stand be taken into account it may well be asserted that the primary knowledge is presented through remembrance or through inference, and as such for that purpose *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* should not be admitted. In fine, Raghunātha provides us with his final remark on the issue: The very assumption on which the foregoing discussion is rooted, viz. two specific attributes (*viśeṣaḡuṇa*) of the self do not occur simultaneously, is unwarranted. Raghunātha illustrates: Twenty fingers of the hands may act simultaneously. Hence the mediation of universal should not be necessarily called for.

Raghunātha then rejects the view-point of an opponent advocating *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, who, according to the commentators Jagadīśa and Gadādhara, is Pragalbha. For want of Ms. material it has not been possible for us to check up the ascription. As usual, Raghunātha does not bring in the contention of the opponent but simply rejects it. But Vāsudeva refers to this view (loc. cit., p. 130) and from his treatment we may have a clear idea of the opponent's contention. The opponent thinks that the assumption of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is necessitated in the case of universal relation between two universals (*sāmānya*). A universal comprises within itself all individuals irrespective of time and space. Without knowing the individuals in their entirety the universals cannot be known, resulting in the non-ascertainment of *vyāpti* between the two. Thus for the knowledge of all individuals *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* should be admitted. In his

criticism of the above view Raghunātha simply follows the footsteps of Vāsudeva and adds nothing new of his own (cf. *gavetarāvṛttitve sati goniṣṭhātyantābhāvāpratiyogijātītvam gotvam iti nirvacanāt*. Vās p. 130=*gotve ca goniṣṭhātyantābhāvāpratiyogitvena ... gavetarāsamavetaṁ vyāpyatvāvacchedakam* . TCd). The reply is merely another formulation of the concept of universals (e.g. cowness) and thereby an attempt has been made to avoid any reference to all individuals. The opponent had in his mind the traditional formulation of such universals (viz. *gotva*) which stands as follows : *gavetarāvṛttitve sati sakalagovṛttijātītvam* (cf. Vās p. 130)=*sakalagovṛttitvaviśeṣitam* TCd. Vāsudeva and following him Raghunātha formulated this concept in another way as already noted, simply to do away with the reference to all individuals, so that *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* may not be called for.

In the concluding section Raghunātha brings in another problem which drew the attention of the Navyanaiyāyikas from pre-Gaṅgeśa period. Just like a faithful commentator Raghunātha here sometimes explains the vocabulary of Gaṅgeśa but, as characteristic with him, does not satisfy himself merely with commenting on Gaṅgeśa. He brings in many things haphazardly already pointed out by his predecessors. After the *siddhānta*-section of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* Gaṅgeśa introduces in the form of an appendix a criticism of the view-point of a *sāmānyalakṣaṇādvādin*¹. The commentators of Gaṅgeśa before Raghunātha, such as Yajñapati, Jayadeva, Vāsudeva and Rucidatta engaged themselves in sharp polemics on the issue raised by the opponent and Gaṅgeśa's reply thereto. The opponent thinks : Emergence of desire with regard to object not yet cognised can only be explained with the admission of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. Nothing can be desired which is not cognised. The opponent explains the point with the help of an illustration and an alternative : If pleasure has already been cognised, no desire with regard to the same would arise. If, on the other

1. Mathurānātha mistakenly ascribes this view to Vallabha, the author of *Nyāyalīlāvatī* (cf. Mathurānātha's *Rahasya*, p. 284, 15), *Nyāyalīlāvatī* contains no such argument. It is the commentators of NL, e.g. Śaṅkara Miśra and Vardhamāna, who read such arguments into the text of NL (cf. NLkaṇṭh p. 493, 1—314, NLpr p. 493, 28—494, 22).

hand, it is yet to be cognised no desire would emerge. Therefore the object of desire must be somehow cognised before the same is desired. And herein the universal character of pleasure serves the purpose of contact leading to the cognition of all individual pleasures. Gaṅgeśa in his criticism to the above solution works with the tacit assumption that it is the identical character of adjective (*samānaprakāra*) and not that of the substantive (*samānaviṣaya*) that determines the causal nexus between knowledge and desire and as this adjectival character (viz. pleasureness) is already known, it may reasonably stir up desire with regard to some other pleasure not yet experienced, although the substantives (i.e. individual pleasure) differ to a great extent. As individual objects of pleasure should not be necessarily experienced beforehand the question of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* does not arise. Gaṅgeśa does not indulge in polemics but makes a brief and categorical observation. But Yajñapati brings in a lot of discussions on the point. His treatment shows that before him threadbare discussions were carried on which he records. With this came also the problem of erroneous perception. Yajñapati defends the opponent against Gaṅgeśa. The entire section in Yajñapati together with his own observations has been quoted verbatim by Rucidatta beginning with *atra vadanti* (cf. Yaj Folio 33a. 1—34a. 1=Ruc Folio 32.1—33a)¹. Rucidatta finds fault with Yajñapati and asserts that inference may serve the purpose for which *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is admitted. Jayadeva's treatment is brief and he follows more or less the same line of thought as Yajñapati. Vāsudeva's treatment is a restatement of Yajñapati's view and a refutation of the same. He sticks to the standpoint of Gaṅgeśa with certain modifications.

To come to Raghunātha : he first reproduces the argument which some of his predecessors advanced against Gaṅgeśa. Gaṅgeśa upholds uniformity of adjective as determinant to causality, but the opponent avers that this view does

1. Reference is made to Yajñapati's Comm. on TC preserved in the Raj Library, Darbhanga and a hand-written copy of the same in the Indological Institute, Vienna. For Rucidatta's Comm. on TC vide Calcutta Sanskrit College Ms. 1108.

not explain how desire is generated with regard to the object of that particular knowledge and not to the other. The follower of Gaṅgeśa in order to steer clear of this difficulty introduces the notion of container and the thing contained (*ādhāradheya*) and says that knowledge generates desire of that object in which the adjective qualifying the knowledge subsists. This argument of the *prakāravādin* hinted by Raghunātha has its parallel in the opponent's argument reproduced by Yajñapati (cf. Yaj, Folio 33a = Vās, p. 128 = Ruc, Folio 32b). The *viśayavādin* argues that this view cannot explain the emergence of desire in the case of erroneous cognition, since in that case the adjective does not subsist in the object lying before the senses. This reply which Raghunātha reports is a restatement of a reply recorded by Jayadeva (cf. *asmākan tu ... tathā sati bhramasthale rajatajñānāt śuktāvicchāna syāt*. TCāloka). Raghunātha finally concludes that one may just infer the existence of future happiness and hence for that *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* should not necessarily be admitted.

To conclude: Raghunātha's treatment of the *sāmānyalakṣaṇā-prakaraṇam* shows that he takes interest in polemical discussions. He brings in this connection the arguments and counter-arguments of the proponent and the opponent. But one is disappointed when he seeks for the exact significance of the opponent's standpoint. Raghunātha sometimes simply suggests them in brief, sometimes leaves them out. He seldom dives deep into a problem and mixes up diverse elements in a diffused manner so that one is confronted with difficulty to have a clear view of the problem in the period around him. He never declares his own opinion and decides to remain in the background. In the development of a particular theory he seldom contributes anything concrete, but takes pleasure in formal niceties.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONCEPT OF TARKA IN NAVYA-NYĀYA

The Neo-logicians of Bengal and Mithila dilate much upon the role of Tarka as a process of reasoning. The problem attracted the attention of pre-Gaṅgeśa writers, particularly Udayana and Śrīharṣa, and the commentators of Gaṅgeśa also such as Yajñapati Upādhyāya, Jayadeva Miśra, Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, Rucidatta Upādhyāya and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi furnish an elaborate discussion on the concept. A searching analysis of their works provides us with a true picture of the creative mind of that age. Of these authors again Yajñapati, Vāsudeva and Rucidatta represent faithfully previous speculations on this topic, whereas Jayadeva and Raghunātha are extremely fond of brevity and their marshalling of data furnished by previous writers is not at all systematic which makes their work studded with abstruseness. An attempt will be made in this chapter to bring out a clear picture of the problem of Tarka as it stands in the period around Gaṅgeśa and to find out how far he is loyal to his predecessors and wherein lies his originality and critical insight. With this objective in view it will be our endeavour to see how Gaṅgeśa treats the problem.

To come to Gaṅgeśa : we find that in the *siddhānta* section of *Vyāptigrahopāya* (means for the ascertainment of Universal Concomitance) Gaṅgeśa observes : 'Knowledge of co-existence (between the probans and the probandum) coupled with the absence of knowledge of deviation is the condition for the ascertainment of universal concomitance. Knowledge (occurring

in the expression 'absence of knowledge') is (of two types, viz.) assertion and doubt. That (i.e. doubt) (may arise) sometimes due to doubt about (the existence of any) condition (*upādhi*), sometimes due to the cognition of common attributes coupled with the non-cognition of specific attributes. Absence of that (i.e. doubt about the presence of condition) may (result) sometimes due to Reasoning, (which) excludes the opposite possibility, sometimes *eo ipso* (i.e. when the opposite possibility does not present itself to us).

The section called *Tarkaprakaraṇa* is founded on these two sentences. Gaṅgeśa's position is as follows :—He brings in the service of Reasoning for the elimination of doubt. But doubt about the necessity of concomitance may result from either of the two factors referred to above, viz, doubt about the presence of condition or due to the lack of knowledge of specific attribute resulting in the absence of determination of one of the two alternatives occurring in cases of doubt. It is with regard to the elimination of first kind of doubt, i.e. doubt as to the presence of any condition, that Reasoning is called into requisition. Gaṅgeśa then institutes an age-old discussion which already drew the attention of his predecessors. Tarka stands for the elimination of doubt about the unconditional invariability of the concomitance. But the very concept of Tarka is by itself founded on the unwavering conviction of invariable concomitance of the two factors involved in it, viz, *āpādya* (consequent) and *āpādaka* (ground). For example, if the sceptic entertains any doubt as to whether the concomitance between smoke and fire is determined by the presence of any condition or not—this doubt can be eliminated by the following hypothetical reasoning: 'If smoke were not a necessary concomitant of fire, it would not have been a product of fire'. The efficacy of this statement is grounded on the tacit assumption of the necessary invariability between the absence of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire and the absence of the fact that smoke is a product of fire. Now the sceptic makes capital out of this determinant invariability, the prior assertion of which facilitates the application of Reasoning and as such it would require Reasoning to justify its existence resulting in an endless process

of doubt and reasoning—an absurd assumption on the face of it.¹

The above charge which Gaṅgeśa records goes back to the period before Udayana² and Gaṅgeśa in reply brings in nothing new but faithfully reproduces the solution offered by Udayana. The concomitance on which Reasoning is rooted does in no way stand in need of another Reasoning, for the simple reason that doubt about the invariability of the relation between *āpādyā* and *āpādaka* is rendered impossible. Such doubt is set at rest at the outset by the self-contradiction of an accepted truth. Self-contradiction (*vyāghāta*) is the limit of doubt and when such self-contradiction renders the emergence of doubt impossible for the lack of its *modus operandi* an appeal to Reasoning would transpire to be a fruitless endeavour. Gaṅgeśa takes a concrete example : If smoke were a product it would emerge either in a place where fire is or in a place where fire is conspicuous by its absence. If smoke does not fulfil any of the two requirements it cannot be considered as a product at all. But such a possibility is precluded as it contradicts our own experience. It may be further doubted that smoke emerges out of something which is not fire or sometimes is determined by fire, sometimes by something other than it, or it may also be doubted if smoke is produced without any cause. But all of these alternatives can be demonstrated as groundless due to self-contradiction, nay contradiction with our practical behaviour. The case of doubt referred to above relates to causality. The sceptic demurs to accept any necessary relation between two events, say, smoke and fire, although smoke is a product. What is a product must have a determinant cause. Now, if such doubt is entertained as to whether fire is the cause of smoke, the sceptic would be confronted with the contradiction of our behaviour, as it is a fact of our experience that the person who is in need of smoke kindles up fire. Such behaviour is the result of our decided conviction in the concomitance of fire and smoke. The net result of this discussion is to demonstrate that the process of doubting is not an endless series and

1. Such a Tarka is *tarkābhāsa*—cf N.R. p. 30.

2. *Nanu tarko'pyavinābhāvam apekṣya pravartate, tato'navasthayā bhavitavyam*. NKu. p. 345, 1.

hence for rebutting the same the services of Reasoning should not necessarily be requisitioned. As such the concomitance of ground and consequent on which Reasoning is rooted cannot be doubted, as it involves self-contradiction. Thus the charge of infinite regress is refuted.

It is worthy of notice in this connection that although Gaṅgeśa does not introduce anything new but simply endorses the opinion of Udayana, Maṇikanṭha Miśra in his *Nyāyaratna*¹ curiously enough characterises contradiction as a type of Reasoning. This very assumption of Maṇikanṭha that Reasoning invariably determines universal concomitance runs counter to the prevalent opinion which seeks the aid of Reasoning only in case of doubt and when doubt does not emerge due to contradiction Reasoning is not called for.

Gaṅgeśa next embarks upon a thorough criticism of Śrīharṣa's contention against Udayana. Udayana, as we have seen, makes capital out of contradiction (*vyāghāta*) of practical behaviour in order to steer clear of the charge of infinite regress. And herein Śrīharṣa clinches the issue. He contends that on a critical analysis of the nature of contradiction it transpires that contradiction is nothing but the opposition (*virodha*) of doubt and behaviour, or in other words, absence of co-existence of doubt and behaviour on a universal basis. This is intrinsically a case of negative concomitance of doubt and behaviour. Thus, in order to get rid of the charge of infinite regress the Realist is constrained to admit another concomitance which may again be subjected to doubt. Hence one solution leads to a series of difficulties.² In reply to the above charge Gaṅgeśa simply reproduces Udayana's solution that doubt is set at rest by contradiction of our own activity. This contradiction is self-evident and is not founded upon any intrinsic belief in universal concomitance as Śrīharṣa thinks it to be. Gaṅgeśa seems to take exception to Śrīharṣa's looking at contradiction as a case of universal phenomena. And as such it does not stand in need of any logical relation on

1. *atrocyate/sarvatra tarkād eva vyāptigrahaḥ/vyāghāto'pi tarkaviśeṣa eva*. NR., p. 15. 6-7. cf also *vyāghāto'pi tadītaraprakārāntarbhūtas tarko'vagantavyaḥ*. NR., p. 36, 4.

2. *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. p. 369; TC., p. 406, 3-4.

universal basis.¹ Contradiction *per se* precludes the possibility of emergence of doubt.

The possibility of the assertion of universal concomitance and the necessity of Reasoning in this logical process have further been substantiated by Gaṅgeśa from another consideration. It has been made abundantly clear that the main objective of the sceptic is to bring out the impossibility of the elimination of doubt. And herein Gaṅgeśa retorts : On this supposition the elimination of doubt by observing specific attributes would turn out to be a fruitless endeavour. When such doubt is entertained if *x* is a man or a tree, one takes recourse to the observation of specific attributes of man and the tree respectively in order to eliminate such a doubt. But such process of elimination of doubt can be adhered to only when the uniformity of co-existence between the specific characteristics, viz, hand, head etc. or branches etc. and the object of doubt, i.e. man or the tree respectively, is ascertained. Such uniformity is self-evident and hence cannot be doubted. Otherwise it will involve a paradox in our behaviour. This observation of Gaṅgeśa is also a reproduction of Maṇikanṭha who puts forward the same consideration in his criticism of Śrīharṣa.² Hence in the two points raised by Gaṅgeśa in his examination of Śrīharṣa's position he adds nothing new, but faithfully represents the viewpoint of his predecessors.

The next point raised by Gaṅgeśa is on the efficacy of repeated observation in the process of induction and part played by Reasoning in this inductive process. Repeated observation (*bhūyodarśana*) of uniformity is of course a means for the assertion of universal concomitance between two facts, but it *per se* has got no efficacy in the said assertion of concomitance. In spite of repeated observation doubt about the necessity of the concomitance may occur, for the elimination of which Reasoning is resorted to. It should however be understood that the scope of Reasoning as an eliminator of doubt extends to such cases where universal concomitance is ascertained through per-

1. NR. *Dyutimālikā*, p. 14, 16-19 ; NR., p. 18, 6-8.

2. *na vā viśeṣadarśanāt kvacit śaṅkānivṛttir evaṃ syāt. TC. p. 407, I-2-na kvacid api viśeṣadarśanāt śaṅkānivṛttiḥ. NR., p. 19, 3-4.*

ception. But where the same is a case of verbal cognition it does not stand in need of any Reasoning. Then Gaṅgeśa differentiates between correct and incorrect Reasoning and asserts that it is the former which leads to the ascertainment of universal concomitance, otherwise the assertion would be invalid.

In the concluding portion of Tarka section of TC. Gaṅgeśa reports the solution of two of his predecessors, referred to as *apare* and *anye*, on the charge of infinite regress in case the services of Reasoning is called for. The *apare* also think that Reasoning is founded upon universal concomitance. But that does not necessarily imply that this foundational concomitance is always open to doubt—leading to the infinite recurrence of doubts. If such concomitance is for the first time ascertained or, in other words, if it is presentative in character it is open to doubt, but if, on the other hand, it is a case of memory-knowledge determined by latent impressions left by its primary cognition it cannot be reasonably doubted, as different volitional activities of a new-born babe which it inherits from previous births, i.e. sucking of mother's breasts or falling from mother's lap leading to its own good or otherwise respectively. Such activities although based on the knowledge of necessary concomitance, the latter can on no account be doubted as the concomitance is remembered and not felt.

Gaṅgeśa does not say a single word on this but embarks upon a new solution advanced by some thinkers. The position of these thinkers may be stated as follows : There are certain relations the belief in whose validity has been handed down from time immemorial and as such they cannot be assailed by doubt. When a Reasoning is grounded on such beliefs the foundational concomitance is not open to doubt. This relation may be either of the nature of causality or of opposition. In both these cases the initial belief in the necessity of their concomitance cannot be subjected to doubt. This view may be traced back to the period before Śrīharṣa¹ and Gaṅgeśa in his criticism simply dittoes Śrīharṣa. Gaṅgeśa asserts that belief, however old it may be, is not an accredited means of knowledge. If it be considered as a means of knowing it is no better than Inference, involving again doubt with regard to the universal

1. cf. *Kh. kh. kh.*, p. 369.

concomitance which stands at the root of that inference. Thus this consideration is also subjected to the same charge for the solution of which its services have been requisitioned.

With this ends Gaṅgeśa's treatment of the problem of infinite regress as charged by the opponent in case the services of reasoning are requisitioned for the elimination of doubt about the invariability and necessity of the relation between the ground and the consequent in Induction. Gaṅgeśa next embarks upon the problem of exact *modus operandi* of Reasoning in our inferential process and in this connection he records a view of some older logicians as *anye* who assert that Reasoning has not a direct bearing on the determination of universal concomitance. They think that the ascertainment of the absence of condition (*upādhi*) is instrumental to the knowledge of concomitance. And it is the former which is ascertained through Reasoning which excludes the opposite possibility (*vipakṣabādhaka*). Gaṅgeśa's position differs from the above view in this respect that according to him Reasoning serves only to eliminate doubt and the ascertainment of *vyāpti* results from both the knowledge of co-existence of the probans and the probandum and the absence of knowledge of the failure of their concomitance. Hence Gaṅgeśa finds fault with the above view of the opponent on the ground that as Reasoning has not been considered to be an instrument of cognition it cannot provide us with the ascertainment of *vyāpti*. What Gaṅgeśa wants to impress upon is that as Reasoning is not an accredited means of knowledge it lacks the causal efficiency with regard to the knowledge of universal concomitance. It can at best eliminate doubt with regard to the failure of concomitance.

In the concluding portion of this section Gaṅgeśa brings out the futility of an opinion attributed by the commentators to a section of Mīmāṃsakas, who hold that universal concomitance is ascertained through the observation of co-existence between two entities and does not require the assistance of Reasoning for that purpose. This is the view propounded by Kumārila in his *Ślokavārttika*. Gaṅgeśa's observation on the opinion is definitely thought-provoking when he says that the Mīmāṃsaka's view would amount to absolute negation of all inference *as such* as a means of valid cognition. For even in

case of a valid inference unfailing co-existence between the probandum (i.e. fire) and the difference from the subject (i.e. other-than-hill) of the inference can be observed. The existence of the probandum in the subject of the inference is doubtful before inference occurs. Doubt is the psychological condition of inference. Thus what is observed is the co-existence of the probandum with that what is different from the subject. Now if mere observation of co-existence between two entities guarantees the invariability of their relation, the probandum would turn out to be concomitant with the difference-from-the-subject. But as obviously this difference (i.e. *pakṣabheda*) is conspicuous by its absence in the subject we would be constrained to assume the absence of the probandum in the subject of the inference involving thereby an absurdity, for it would amount to the denial of inference altogether as a scientific method of knowledge. With this ends Gaṅgeśa's treatment of Reasoning.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONCEPT OF *PAKṢATĀ* IN NAVYA-NYĀYA

The definition of *anumāna* (inference) formed by Gaṅgeśa¹ (C. 1300-1360 A.D.) involves basically two notions, viz, *vyāpti* (relation of pervasion) and *pakṣadharmatā* (notion of being a property of the subject). The latter involves the notion of a logical subject (*pakṣatā*). After devoting a considerable portion of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* to the notion of *vyāpti*, Gaṅgeśa discusses the nature of a subject of inference (*pakṣa*), i.e., where a property is sought to be proved on the basis of logical reason (*hetu*). This is a psychological condition of inference. Before we proceed to infer we must be sure of the conditions under which inference is possible.²

On an analysis of the text of TC we find Gaṅgeśa rejecting three definitions of *pakṣatā* proposed by his predecessors and then formulating his own definition.

Let us review the definitions on the line of Gaṅgeśa ; DI. *sandigdhasādhya dharmatvam*³ ("that which is possessed of doubt-

1. *Vyāptiviśiṣṭapakṣadharmatājñānājanyam jñānam*. TC. p. 20.
2. It should be noted in this connection that although both the notions of *vyāpti* and *pakṣatā* determine the emergence of inference, the former can do so only through the mediacy of a synthetic judgment (known as *parāmarśa*) arising out of it, the latter is directly responsible for the emergence of inferential knowledge.
3. This definition is associated with the early Naiyāyikas before Uddyotakara, cf. *nā'nupalabdhe na nirñūte'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate kīntarhi saṁśayite* (*Nyāyabhāṣya* on I 1. 1). Śivāditya in Navyanyāya circle before Gaṅgeśa upholds this view, *sandigdhasādhya venopāttatvam pakṣatvam*. *Saptapadārthī*, p. 71.

ful inferable property"). Although *pakṣatā*, as evident from the above definition, is a property of the subject on which the inferable property (*sādhya*) is doubted, Gaṅgeśa's critique shows that he wants to lay stress on the qualifier part (*viśeṣaṇa*) and understands the definition as signifying the doubt of the *sādhya* (*sādhyaśaṁśaya*), and not the occurrence of the doubtful property, as the psychological condition of inference.

Gaṅgeśa outright rejects the definition on the ground that doubt cannot have any direct bearing on the emergence of inference, since the perception of the mark (*liṅga*), memory-knowledge of the relation of pervasion, etc. occur in the wake of doubt about the inferable property and then and then only inference arises. So inference is least dependent on doubt. A cause is held to be immediate antecedent to the effect and the cause and effect in order to be related do not admit of any time-gap. Moreover, doubt ceases to exist at the moment prior to inference, since it has to make room for other psychical events contributory to inference, constituting the synthetic judgment (*parāmarśa*).

Next definition cited by Gaṅgeśa is as follows :

D 2. *sādhakabādhakapramāṇābhāva*. Raghunātha explains it as the absence of the assertion (*siddhi*) of the *sādhya* and contradiction (*bādhā*). In fact till the ascertainment of inferable property or ascertainment of its absence on the subject, potency (*yogyatā*) of doubt continues to exist and such potency may well serve as a determinant to inference. Gaṅgeśa retorts that the absence of *siddhi* and *bādhā* both are redundant, in view of the fact that any one of the two is sufficient enough to make inference possible. Moreover, prior assertion of the inferable property does not retard its inference. We can infer the same entity once perceived or known through a different reason.

The third definition referred to by Gaṅgeśa is :

D 3. *śiṣādhayaṣita-sādhya dharmādharmī pakṣaḥ*. The first two definitions are nicknamed as the standpoint of *śaṁśaya-pakṣatā* in Navya-nyāya circle, whereas this definition which is believed to have been formulated by Vācaspati is termed as

icchāpakṣatā.¹ A person seeking release from bondage, although knows the nature of self through scriptures but still infers its existence. Hence Vācaspati claims that one may infer the existence of something already known if and only if he has the desire to infer (*śiṣādhayiṣā*). Gaṅgeśa while rejecting this definition follows the same line of argument that 'desire to infer' is separated by time-gap and hence a remote condition, which cannot be regarded as a cause. Nor it is easy to ascertain that 'potency of desire' continues to exist. On the contrary, it is a fact of our experience that we infer cloud by its roar, even in the absence of any desire as such. Such inference for one's own sake (*svārthānumāna*) is not preceded by any desire to infer.

Pointing out the defects in opponent's definitions Gaṅgeśa formulates his own : *śiṣādhayiṣāviraahasahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvo yatra asti sa pakṣaḥ* (T. C. p. 1092) ("which possesses absence of causal factors of perception coupled with the absence of desire to infer"). This definition has the advantage of explaining the occurrence of inference in such cases where causal factors of perception are present, of course, attended by a desire to infer. This leads to fourfold possibilities : a) Presence of causal factors of perception coupled with desire to infer, b) Absence of causal factors coupled with absence of desire and c) Absence of causal factors, coupled with desire to infer. In the above three cases inference will arise. But if the presence of causal factor is not attended by a desire to infer, inference would not be possible. To take Nyāya dictum : A qualificative absence (*viśiṣṭābhāva*) is conditioned by three possible alternatives : i) due to the absence of the qualificand (*viśeṣya*), or ii) of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), or iii) of both. The final definition formulated by Gaṅgeśa involves a qualificative absence, i.e., *absence* of causal factor coupled with the absence of desire (to infer). Alternative (a) is covered by (ii), (b) by (i) and (c) by (iii). So far is Gaṅgeśa's treatment.

Gaṅgeśa's definition was further developed by his commentators Yājñapati Upādhyāya (C. 1410-1470 A. D.), Jayadeva

1. In early Nyāya Uddyotakara and following him Vācaspati uphold the theory of *icchāpakṣatā*. cf. *bubhutsāvato dvitīyāt liṅgadarśanāt anumānam bhavati*. NV. p. 44, 2-7.

alias Pakṣadhara Miśra (C. 1430-1490), Vāsudeva Sārva-bhauma (C. 1430-1540 A.D.) and the famous Raghunātha-Śiromaṇi (C. 1460—1520), although final development of the notion of *pakṣatā* is to be found in Jagadīśa's (C. 1550-1610) commentary on TC *Dīdhiti*. Narahari, Yajñapati's son, in his *Dūṣaṇoddhāra*, defended Yajñapati against the attack of Jayadeva. We shall concentrate here on the early commentators of Gaṅgeśa to find out the course of development.

Yajñapati in his TC *prabhā*,¹ the earliest available commentary on TC, concentrates firstly on the hostile elements (*pratibandhaka*) which check the emergence of inference. In doing so, he sees in Gaṅgeśa's expression *sādhakamāna* two distinct factors : i) causal factors of perception and ii) assertion of the inferable property—both of which stand in the way of inference. As such the absence of either of the two would facilitate the operation of inference.² The next point raised by Yajñapati is that of a *pūrvapakṣin* who points out as follows : Well, if there is desire to infer, assertion of inferable property through other means of knowing would not check the operation of inference. But if after desire we see the mark (*liṅgadarśana*), remember the invariable relation between the mark and the inferable property (*vyāptismṛti*) and then synthetic judgment (*parāmarśa*) arises, in such cases by the time synthetic judgment arises, desire ceases to exist, which obviously would fail to determine emergence of inference. Yajñapati avoids the difficulty by positing that a distinct desire would again emerge in the wake of synthetic judgment and this desire would give rise to another judgment involving the memory-knowledge of the relation of pervasion which will immediately precede inference. In this solution indicated by Yajñapati the charge of time-gap between desire and inference has been met, but Yajñapati himself seems to be least satisfied with this solution, since he puts forward an alternative solution. He suggests that in the series first comes the remembrance of the relation of pervasion followed by the emergence of desire, which in its turn gives rise to synthetic

1. Darbhanga Raj Library, Mithila, Ms.

2. Yaj. f. 46. 2. *tathā ca śiṣādhayaṣāvirahasahakṛtasya siddhyanumānātriktatatsiddhikaraṇānyasya vā sāmānyābhāvo yat ra sa pakṣa ityarthah paryavasyati.* cf. also TCd. p. 1155.

judgement involving the memory-knowledge of *vyāpti*, which is on the verge of decline. This leads finally to inference. In this theory desire can well play its role in the emergence of inference. (Yaj. 47. 2-48. 1 = Narahari¹f. 73).

Narahari records a *pūrvapakṣin* who seeks to resolve the problem of time-gap by resorting to the interpretation of the term *śiṣādhayaṣā* as *śiṣādhayaṣā-yogyatā*, i.e. to say, 'the potency of desire to infer', which obviously continues to exist even if desire as such ceases to exist and this potency may well determine the emergence of inference. By 'potency' is here meant the span of time required for the emergence of synthetic judgement. It is to be noted that this interpretation of *śiṣādhayaṣā* referred to by Narahari (folio 72) and Raghunātha has been attributed by Gadādhara to Jayadeva (*Miśramatam āha. Gādādhari*, p. 1124). Had it originated from Jayadeva his pupil Narahari would have cited it as *asmad-gurucaraṇāḥ*, as he has done in almost all cases where he refers to his teacher. On the other hand, he simply says *atra kecit*. Raghunātha also is silent in mentioning by name, whom he refers to as *anye vadanti* (TCd. 1124-26). I am tempted to think that this solution might have originated with some Naiyāyika prior to Jayadeva and Jayadeva simply records it.

On the other hand, we have it on the authority of Narahari that Jayadeva interprets *pakṣatā* as the 'absence of (prior) assertion' (*siddhyabhāva*),² which comes closer to the definition rejected by Gaṅgeśa, although at the same time he admits that the two absences, viz., a) absence of 'assertion attended by the

1. Narahari in his *Dūṣaṇoddhāra* seeks to defend his father Yajñapati at every step against the onslaught of Jayadeva, his teacher. In doing so he quotes in verbatim passages after passages from Yajñapati's *TC prabhā*. On the other hand, a comparison of Yajñapati's text on the problem with that of Raghunātha's *Didhiti* where he refers to Yajñapati's solution by name (*iti Upādhyāyāḥ*. Tcd. p. 1123, *Gādādhari*, p. 1124, *Yajñapatisamādhānam āha*) shows that Raghunātha in rephrasing Yajñapati's solution totally changes its character and leaves out altogether the alternative solution advanced by Yajñapati.

2. *atra gurucaraṇāḥ, nirukṭābhāvadvayaṁ kāraṇam iti avivādam. pakṣatā tu siddhyabhāva eva. Nar. folio 70.*

absence of desire' and b) absence of causal factors of perception, which in Yajñapati's opinion constitute *pakṣatā*, have causal potency (*karaṇa*) in relation to inference. Jayadeva's argument in support of his definition is based on the logic of simplicity (*lāghava*). The opponent's definition involves absence of both assertion and means of assertion and hence is based on the assumption of greater number of notions, over which Jayadeva's definition enjoys preference.

Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, a junior contemporary of Jayadeva, develops the theory further. He sees no reason behind Yajñapati's theory that a distinct desire would emerge, nor is the hypothesis of continued potency of desire is acceptable to him. So he improves upon the preceding definitions as follows : *siṣādhayiṣāvirahaniṣtha-svādhikaraṇa-kṣaṇāvyavahitottarakṣaṇavar-tiprakṛtānumitika-samānaviṣaya-prakāra - samānasiddhitvābhāy-avat-samānaviṣayaprakārasiddhireva siṣādhayiṣā-virahaviṣiṣṭāy-āstasyābhāvasya vivakṣitatvāt*.¹ (Vās folio 117. 5-7). In short "(*pakṣatā* consists in the) absence of assertion, coupled with the absence of desire, which (assertion) is different from that (i.e. *siddhi*), after the next moment of which inference is caused and (which moment is) characterised by the absence of desire". Obviously this definition has the preference over the other. The problem centred round assertion as an hostile element to inference and to make it inefficient the notion of *siṣādhayiṣā* was brought in. Now even if in the absence of *siṣādhayiṣā* (since hypothetically it ceases to exist) and presence of assertion inference arises, Vāsudeva sees no harm in it, since such an assertion is followed by inference and the absence of an assertion distinct from this is looked upon as constituting *pakṣatā*. To Vāsudeva such an assertion, which is coupled with the absence of desire, and at the next moment of which inference arises, cannot be regarded as an hostile element, since he considers *that* assertion as an hostile element which is distinct from the one referred to above and absence of *that* assertion facilitates inference. Thus in such crucial instance where the moment of assertion is followed by the moment of the emer-

1. Raghunātha cites this definition in his own inimitable way (vide *TCd.* p. 1131). Gaḍādhara ascribes it to Sārvabhauma: *Sārvabhaumasya matam āha* p. 1131).

gence of inference even in the absence of desire, postulation of the emergence of a distinct desire or the introduction of the notion of potency would be uncalled for.

Vāsuḍeva's definition anticipates another well-known method viz., notion of hostility (*pratibandhakatā*), which deserves consideration. It has been said that assertion checks inference, only if the nature of the two agrees in all respects. To be precise : we can express inference of fire from smoke in two different ways : a) Mountain possesses fire (*parvato vahnimān*) and b) Fire exists on the mountain (*parvate vahniḥ*). It should be noted that the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and the qualifier (*prakāra*) differ in two expressions. The qualifier in the first case is 'fire', whereas in the second case it is 'mountain'. Likewise, the qualificand in the first case is 'mountain', whereas in the second it is 'fire'. Now if the prior assertion is of the form (a), it will check inference of the same form but cannot retard the operation of inference of the form (b). But Raghunātha¹ gave his verdict for the old theory that assertion in any form whatsoever would act as a hostile element in the emergence of inference notwithstanding whatever form of expression it takes.

Likewise 'hostility' should be understood in another way. Take the expression : 'Mountain possesses fire'. Now this expression admits of two possibilities : (a) Occurrence of fire attributed to all mountains (*parvatatvāvacchedena* or *pakṣatāvācchedakāvācchedena*), or (b) to some indefinite mountain which is limited by the generic property mountainness (*pakṣatāvācchedakāśāmānādhikaranyena*). Thus with reference to (a) i.e. when fire is inferred on all mountains, assertion of inferable property, i.e., fire, on all mountains will be hostile, but to (b), where fire is sought to be inferred on some indefinite mountain, assertion of the nature of (a) and of (b) both will stand as hostile. Raghunātha elucidates the above two points (TCd-pp. 1113, 1119) which deserve consideration while determining the causal nexus between *pakṣatā* and *anumiti*, since the notion of *pakṣatā* presupposes the removal of an hostile element.

It is clear from the above analysis that originally 'absence of assertion' (*siddhyabhāva*) was considered to be the criterion of a

1. TCd. p. 1119, *siddhimṛtan virodhi*.

logical subject of inference'. In course of time two opposite blocks holding the theories of *saṁśaya-pakṣatā* and *icchāpakṣatā* respectively occupied the field. Navyanyāya predominantly follows the latter. After Gaṅgeśa Yajñapati introduces certain new ideas continued by Jayadeva. But Vāsudeva's analysis is more linguistic. He draws upon Gaṅgeśa's definition with necessary modification. Raghunātha is here more systematic and hinges on the problem than in the previous sections of his *Dīdhiti* commentary. But here also he remains in the background. Neither he commits himself to any of the prevalent views, nor he formulates any definition of his own. It is interesting that at the close of his commentary on this section he makes a sudden reference to the Prabhākara's critique of *pakṣatā* and leaves it unchallenged.

CHAPTER IX

ŚĀBDABODHA AS A SEPARATE TYPE OF PRAMĀṆA

In Indian tradition the understanding of the meaning of a sentence is known as *śābdabodha*. Through *sābdabodha* a successful communication holds between the speaker and hearer, when a sentence is uttered. But how do we understand the meaning of a sentence? A sentence when uttered can deliver its meaning only when it conforms to certain norms. They are the auxiliary conditions which make a sentence semantically acceptable. When a sentence is uttered an attentive hearer cognises the words and understands the meaning of the sentence. This cognition of the meaning of a sentence is a qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*), a judgement, which results in the wake of the understanding of the meaning of the constituent words in the sentence, not directly but coalesced. The word meanings must be mutually connected. This requires that there must be syntactical relation (*samsarga*). This at the outset differentiates *śābdabodha* from other types of valid cognition, e.g. perception, and inference, which concern neither with word-meanings nor with their mutual syntactical relation.

How do we understand the meaning of a sentence? The Indian theorist assumes a psycho-physical process. When a meaningful sentence is uttered the hearer, if he knows the language and is attentive to it, automatically reacts and instantly understands the meanings of the word elements in the sentence. Thereafter the ideal hearer cognises the syntactic relation between the discrete word-meanings. In order to generate *śābdabodha*, the understanding of the meaning of the word elements is not all. It is no doubt the primary condition, but there are some auxiliary conditions. These are cognition (i) of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), (ii) of semantical competency (*yogyatā*), (iii) of contiguity (*āsatti*),

(iv) of speaker's intention (*tātparya*). We need not go into the details of these concepts.¹

We can now concentrate on our main point. Is *śābdabodha* a separate type of *pramāṇa*? At the outset I must make it clear that the Sanskrit word *pramāṇa* is a bit baffling. It has three constituents, a prefix 'pra', a root 'mā' meaning 'to cognise', and a suffix 'lyuṭ'. This 'lyuṭ' suffix can be used in two different meanings according to our ways of thinking, and consequently the derivative structure also differs. When the structure has a passive form e.g. '*pramīyate anena*', it signifies the means of valid cognition and in this meaning the word '*pramāṇa*' is commonly used. When, on the other hand, the derivative structure has a '*bhāva*' form, it signifies the cognition itself. So when we call *śābdabodha* as a *pramāṇa*, it means the resultant cognition. The means of such cognition would be the cognition of the constituent words followed by the understanding of the meanings of 'atomic' words, which ultimately generates the cognition of sentence meaning in an ideal hearer.

The Nyāya accepts this understanding of the sentence meaning as a distinct type of valid cognition, different from other accepted types, viz., perception, inference etc. The Vaiśeṣika, a sister school, however does not accept *śābdabodha* as a separate type of valid cognition, but includes it under inference.² They think that the cognition which is generated from hearing such a word complex as *gaur asti* ('The cow exists') or *gām ānaya* ('Bring a cow') is an inferential knowledge. It is assumed that the Cārvākas, who consider perceptual knowledge as the only type of valid cognition, think that the understanding of the sentence meaning is a case of perception.

We take up the Cārvāka view first and following Jagadīśa³, the noted Navyanaiyāyika of the seventeenth century, see if the cognition of the sentence meaning can be a case of perception.

1. For discussions on these concepts see B. K. Matilal, *The Navyanyāya Doctrine of Negation*.

2. *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* 9. 2. 3: *etena śābdaṁ vyākhyātam. Padārthadharma-saṁgraha* p. 106: *śābdādīnāṁ apyānumāne'ntarbhāvaḥ samāna-vidhivāt*.

3. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, pp. 5-29.

In Nyāya, perception is of two types, direct and indirect. The former is generated when not only the object of perception is actually present to our sense organs but the object is also fit to be perceived by that particular sense organ. Now, there are words which denote a meaning not amenable to our sense perception (*atīndriya*) and it is a fact that cognition of such a word-complex occurs, although direct contact of the sense organs with the content of cognition of the meaning of such sentences is never possible. Also in ordinary cases, where such objects are amenable to our sense perception, e.g., in the cognition of the meaning of the following sentence 'The cow exists', it is not necessary that, for the understanding of the meaning of the sentence, the actual 'cow' must be present before our eyes and that it should be in physical contact with the eyes. Hence *śābdabodha* is not a case of direct perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*)¹.

Now about the other type, i.e., indirect perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*). The cognition of the sentence meaning cannot be considered as a type of indirect perception. The indirect perception is generated by indirect contact (*alaukika pratyāsatti*). An indirect perception occurs when the object perceived is not directly connected with the relevant sense organ. The example below will make our point clear. They are usually of two types: *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and *jñānalakṣaṇa*. To avoid complication I prefer to ignore *yogaja*. *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is a type of perception which is generated through the cognition of generic property. For example: Nyāya holds that when we cognise a particular cow-individual we also at the same time cognise the cow-universal in it and through the cognition of this generic property we might at the next moment perceptually cognise all cow-individuals where such generic property is present. Thus on an analysis of this type of indirect perception, we find that it has to fulfil two requirements, (a) the direct apprehensional connection of perception, i.e. contact of the eye

1. Kṛṣṇakānta in his commentary (p. 5) on *Śābalaśaktiprakāśikā* remarks that what differentiates the understanding of sentence-meaning from Perception is that the latter is not determined by word (*laścīlupatyaḥ śābalaśyānapayogitvāt*).

etc., (b) all individuals under the class are known through *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* connection. But in the cognition of the following sentence meaning 'the cow exists' neither the ordinary connection between our eyes with the actual cow exists, nor do we cognise all cow-individuals. On the other hand, such a sentence as 'the cow exists' refers to a particular cow-individual. Hence *śābdabodha* cannot belong to this type of indirect perception.

The alternative possibility would be to consider *śābdabodha* as a type of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. This type of perception is generated through the mediation of memory-knowledge; for example, when we see a sandalwood which is fragrant and say 'I see a fragrant sandalwood', or 'I see the sandalwood is fragrant' (*surabhi candanam ahaṁ paśyāmi*). It is no doubt a qualificative cognition expressed in language. In a qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭajñāna*), if it is a case of perception, the element known as qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) must also be amenable to perception. But in the above example (i.e. 'The sandalwood is fragrant') the qualifier, i.e. 'fragrance' (*saurabha*) is not fit to be cognised by our eyes. Hence the Naiyāyika considers this as a case of indirect perception. Here the perceptual knowledge is generated not through any direct means but through the memory-knowledge of fragrance, which serves as a connecting link between the organ of the eye and fragrance. Likewise, understanding the meaning of a sentence can be considered as a perception of this type. Even the Nyāya also holds that when a sentence is uttered the hearer understands sentence meaning only after he remembers the meanings of 'atomic' words.

The Navyanyāya argues against this in the following manner: In the example cited above of this type of indirect contact perception *surabhi candanam* ('fragrant sandalwood') the 'sandalwood' is the qualificand and 'fragrance' is the qualifier. But it is not necessary that this should be always the case. It is not necessary that in such an indirect perception 'fragrance' should always be presented to our cognition as a qualifier. There may occur a cognition where the fragrance may be mentioned as a qualificand. In that case the cognition will be expressed as *candane saurabham* ('fragrance occurs in the sandalwood'). Broadly speaking, there is no hard and fast rule that what we

cognise through indirect perception need always be a qualifier. The order may change.¹

But in the cognition of sentence meaning the order of the qualifier and the qualified cannot be reversed.² Consider the sentence : (i) *gaur asti* ('the cow exists'). On analysing the sentence meaning we get: The 'existence' (*astitva*) is the qualifier which characterises the subjunct (*viśeṣya*) 'cow'. This order of succession in the structure of sentence meaning is a fixed one and admits of no change in the case of *śābdabodha*, whereas, as we have seen, it is variable in the case of indirect perception known as *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*.

This will be more clear if we consider the meaning of the following sentence :

(ii) *gām ānaya* ('Bring a cow').

According to the Navyanyāya language (ii) is analysed as

(iii) *go-vṛttikarmatānirupakānayanānukūla-kṛtimāṁ tvam*
('you are qualified by the effort, generating the activity of bringing, which has cow as its object')

Here the meaning of the qualificand/agent i.e. 'you' (*tvam*), which is inflected with a nominative case ending, is made the principal element. All other elements are correlated to one part or the other in a definite order. The verbal suffix *hi*, which denotes mental effort (*kṛti*), qualifies the agent *tvam* and the mental effort is said to be qualified by 'bringing' through causal relation (*janakatā*), while 'bringing' is said to be qualified by 'cow' through the accusative relation (*karmatā*) (i.e. the relation of having it as its object). This accusative relation is expressed by the accusative case ending inflected to the word base *go*

1. Kṛṣṇakānta on *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* p. 6: *upanūtayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasya kāmācārāt*.
2. Jagadīśa in his arguments makes capital out of the distinctive nature of Verbal cognition, viz., a cognition in which two meanings are mutually related in a particular order which admits of no change only when the constituent meanings are cognised through the denotation of words (cf. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* p. 7: *svasavṛtityā padārthānām upasthityuttaram gaṇādāv astitvāder anvayāvagāhī vilakṣaṇo bodho etc.*).

('the cow'). Here the meaning contents of 'cow', accusative inflexion, the act of bringing and the 'mental effort' which generates the 'act of bringing' are interrelated in a fixed succession in accordance with the syntactic and inflexional rules. In Nyāya, this order of interrelation is called *ākāṅkṣā* ('expectancy'), which is one of the prerequisites of *śābdabodha*, and *śābdabodha* can only arise from a sentence which is syntactically well-formed in this manner. It should also be noted here that while (ii) generates the comprehension of a connected meaning, (iii) does not, since (iii) lacks expectancy and the meanings here are discrete.

This character of *śābdabodha* clearly brings out a marked difference from the indirect perception as explained above, known as *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*, in which as we have seen, no such successive interrelation of meaning contents is required. Hence *śābdabodha* is a distinct type of knowledge different from this type of indirect perception.

Before proceeding further it would be well to examine if the cognition of the meaning of a sentence can be of the type of memory-cognition (*smṛti*). In fact, according to Nyāya, to understand the meaning of a sentence, one needs to understand the individual meanings of the 'atomic' words which constitute the sentence. On hearing a sentence we remember the functional relation (*vṛtti*) of the individual words and their such and such meanings. So the Naiyāyikas do recognise that memory-knowledge plays an important part in the understanding of the meaning of a sentence. Why not then consider the understanding of a sentence meaning as a type of memory-cognition.

The Nyāya argument against such a contention is something analogous to the argument already stated in connection with proving *śābdabodha* as a type of cognition distinct from perception. It is true that to understand the sentence meaning we need to remember the individual meanings of the constituent words. But it should also be noted that to remember something we need to cognise it on a previous occasion and after this primary cognition we inherit some impression about the thing. These impressions when revived are known as memory-cognition. Now the Nyāya asserts that the primary cognition

(*anubhava*). the latent impressions (*saṁskāra*) and its revived form, i.e. memory (*smṛti*), must have the similar objective content and sequential inter-relation.¹ But in the case of *śābdabodha* when we remember the meanings of the constituent words they are presented to us in a discrete manner independent of each other. That is why to understand the meaning of a sentence we need not cognise the same sentence meaning before. Only understanding the meanings of the constituent words will suffice. That is why a person who has the language ability can understand a completely new sentence construction which he has not heard before. Hence *śābdabodha* is not memory-cognition.

The Vaiśeṣikas accept only two types of valid cognition : perception and inference. They consider the understanding of the meaning of a sentence as a case of inference. Inference is based on the ascertainment of pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the inferable property (*sādhya*) and the mark (*hetu*). We infer something unperceived from perceived facts. This fundamental principle involved in inference also holds good in the case of cognition of a sentence meaning. Cognition of sentence meaning is after all the ascertainment of the relation existing between the meanings of the component words. This relation can be ascertained only when the person who hears the sentence is not only sure that the word components are syntactically related but also remembers it. When I say 'Bring me a horse', what the hearer does to get the sentence meaning is that he relates the meanings of the component words. This act of relating becomes possible only when we have already known that the individual word meanings possess the requisite expectancy etc. The Vaiśeṣika states the inference as: "The word meanings are mutually related; because they are brought to memory (*smārita*) by the words possessing expectancy etc., as (for example) in the case of such a word complex as 'Bring me a cow'."²

The Nyāya argues against the Vaiśeṣikas as follows: Inference has been defined as a cognition generated by the inferential

1. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 8: *saṁānākārasaṁskāraprabhavatvāt*.

2. Haridāsa on *Nyāyakusumāñjali* 3, 13: cf. also *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. p. 390; also Śaṅkara Miśra on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9.2.3: *ete padārthā mithaḥ saṁsargavantāḥ ākāṅkṣādindabhiḥ smāritatvāt*.

mark (*liṅga*). If this definition is accepted the question will naturally arise: what would be the inferential mark in the case of the understanding of a sentence meaning, such as, for example, (i) *gaur asti* ('the cow exists')? In an ordinary case of inference, say, 'the mountain has fire because of smoke', the 'smoke' is the mark through which the 'fire' is known to exist on the mountain. The Vaiśeṣika should find out some 'mark' by which 'existence' can, on his theory, be proved to exist in the 'cow'. The Vaiśeṣika may however say that semantical competency (*yogyatā*) is the required mark. Semantical competency (*yogyatā*) has sometimes been defined as the 'absence of lack of any contradiction' (*bādhaviraha*). As such the Vaiśeṣika may state the inference as:

- (ii) *gaur astitāvān astitvābhāvavirahavattvāt*
(‘the cow is possessed of existence, because it lacks the absence of existence’).

But, Nyāya argues, to understand the meaning of the sentence *gaur asti* ('the cow exists') it is not always necessary for us to know with certainty that 'cow' lacks the absence of existence. When the sentence *gaur asti* is uttered we understand the meaning of the sentence even if we did not have a prior knowledge of the existence of the cow. In other words, the sentence *gaur asti* will generate *śābdabodha* even when the knowledge of the semantical competency between *gauḥ* and *asti* is not present. Moreover, if semantical competency alone is said to be the 'mark', then from such expressions as *ghataḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛti* ('a pitcher to be an accusative, bringing, an effort'), which is said to lack expectancy (*ākankṣā*), but have semantical competency, the comprehension of the meaning, which we get from *ghaṭam ānaya* ('bring a pitcher'), would have been possible. But none admits that from such expressions as the above comprehension of meaning is possible. Hence semantical competency cannot be the mark (*liṅga*) and, as such, the Vaiśeṣika's attempt to consider the comprehension of sentence meaning as a case of inference is thwarted.¹

1. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, pp. 11—12: *gavādāv astitvāder anubhavārthaṁ na tāvad astitvāder bādhavirahitvarūpaṁ yogyatāmātraṁ liṅgam . . . yogyatāniścayasyānāvaśyakatvāt*.

Confronted with Nyāya critique the Vaiśeṣika faces the situation thus: In the above example, of course, we comprehend the constituent word meanings, but there is nothing unusual in the sentence meaning not being ascertained, as it is an admitted fact that the ascertainment of meanings of words lacking expectancy prohibits the ascertainment of sentence meaning. What Nyāya is trying to say here is that the cognition of word meanings generates in the hearer the cognition of sentence meaning. But this causal relation can be asserted only if there is no hostile fact involved. Expectancy is admitted to be one of the generating conditions and hence when the word components lack expectancy there is nothing unusual in the hearer not understanding the meaning of the sentence.

Jagadīśa answers that even if we assume that the way in which Vaiśeṣika seeks to meet the difficult situation is valid, still the Vaiśeṣika attempt to bring *śābdabodha* under inference is thwarted due to another reason. Remember how the Vaiśeṣika formulated the inference to show that *śābdabodha* is a case of inference. The mark (*liṅga*) in the inference was denoted by the word components possessing expectancy, semantical competency etc. Assertion of the mark in the subject of the inference is a *sine qua non* of valid inference. Hence assertion of semantical competency (*yogyatāniścaya*) must always be there if the Vaiśeṣika wants to put it as the mark in the inference.¹ But Nyāya states that to understand a sentence meaning it is not always necessary that semantical competency be asserted, but even if such competency is *doubtful*, desired communication between the speaker and the hearer i.e. *śābdabodha* will occur.²

1. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 12: *yagyatāmātraliṅgakasaṁsargānumānasyānavayabuddhiṁve ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ityādisthaliyasyāpi tasya tathātvāpātāt.*

2. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 12: *yogyatāyāḥ saṁśayasthale 'py anvaya-buddher ānubhavikatvāt.* Dinakara Bhaṭṭa in his commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktavali* (p. 500) ascribes the view (that even if competency is doubtful *śābdabodha* will occur) to Gaṅgeśa (*maṇikṛtas tvete padārthāḥ paraspasaraṁsargavantaḥ yogyatādi-matpadopasthāpitatvād ityanumāne yogyatā na liṅgaviśeṣaṇam, liṅgasya niścitasyaiva niścāyakatayā yogyatāyāś ca saṁśaye' pi śābdabodhadarśanāt*).

But an entity or feature whose very existence in the subject is doubtful cannot be the mark of an inference. To make it clear: *Śābdabodha* arises from the cognition of competency, it does not matter if such cognition is assertive or is a case of doubt. But inference demands that the mark should be asserted (in the subject). Consequently competency does not comply with the requisites of a 'mark'. Hence, Nyāya says, the Vaiśeṣika cannot make semantical competency a 'mark' of his proposed argument which seeks to include *śābdabodha* in inference.¹

Jagadīśa adds a further argument against the Vaiśeṣika attempt to include cognition of sentence meaning under inferential cognition. Take, for example, the cognition we get from the expression (A) 'The cow exists' (*gaur asti*). Here the qualificand is the 'cow' and the predicate element is expressed by 'exists' or, in other words, 'existence' is the qualifier. Now on Vaiśeṣika theory the cognition of (A) may be put as follows: (B) 'The cow is possessed of existence, because of semantical competency' (*gaur astitātvān योग्यात्ववत्त्वāt*). But Nyāya points out, before stating competency as a mark in the inference one should explicitly characterize 'competency'. Competency is relatedness of the entities expressed by the word components in a sentence. Hence, in the sentence 'the cow exists', we can say, the requisite called 'competency' is 'the cow possessing existence', i.e. to say, the relatedness between 'the cow' and 'existence'. But this relatedness is actually what we want to infer. Consequently the inferable property (*sādhyā*) and the mark (*hetu*) of the inference become identical, i.e. we want to prove something which is already proved (*siddhasādhana*).

To get out of this difficulty Vaiśeṣika may modify the argument (B) by changing the 'mark', i.e. by placing syntactical expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) as the mark. But the question arises, what is expectancy? It is the sequential arrangement of word compo-

1. Cf. Kṛṣṇakānta on *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 12: *śābdabodhau योग्यातृज्ञानात्वेना हेतुत्वād अनुमितौ तु हेतुमत्तानिश्चयस्याया हेतुत्वād योग्यातृस्थालियान्वयabuddhāv अनुमितिवakalpanā sambhavāt.*

nents in a sentence.¹ So expectancy is a syntactic property, i.e. it belongs to component words and not to the concepts or entities expressed by those words. Obviously expectancy cannot be an attribute of the subject of the inference. The subject is invariably a concept or an entity. Thus the inference is based on an unproved mark, a fallacy called *svarūpāsiddhi*, which happens when the mark cannot be proved to exist in the subject of the inference. Thus, Nyāya says, the Vaiśeṣika would have to concede that the cognition generated from hearing a word complex is intrinsically different from inferential cognition.

Moreover, when we say expectancy, competency etc. generate *śābdabodha*, all these causal conditions are on the same footing in generating *śābdabodha*. To put in another way, expectancy is a potential cause, that is to say, it generates *śābdabodha* by its very existence (*svarūpasattayā*).² If the word components have syntactical expectancy *śābdabodha* will arise, it does not matter if we are aware of that expectancy or not. But competency causes a cognition of sentence meaning if such competency is actually *known* to exist in the component word meanings. Hence, when in a *śābdabodha* it does not matter whether we are actually aware of sequential arrangement i.e. expectancy of component words (as it suffices if such arrangement is there) the sequential arrangement cannot be a mark in the inference proposed by the Vaiśeṣika. For, to be a mark in an inference is to be known beforehand by the person who infers. In the inference 'the hill has fire, because of smoke', the smoke cannot be a mark unless we know that it exists on the hill. But when it is an admitted fact that mere *existence* of sequential arrangement generates *śābdabodha*, the Vaiśeṣika fails in his attempt to reduce the cognition that we get from hearing a sentence into an inferential cognition, by stating expectancy as the mark of his proposed inference.

1. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 12: *anvayabodhānukūlanūpūrvviparyavasitā tv ākāṅkṣā*. Vardhamāna in his *Prakāśa* (p. 400) on *Nyāyakusumāñjali* defines *ākāṅkṣā*: *abhidhānāparyavasānam ākāṅkṣā, yena vinā yasya na svārthānvañubhāvakatvam tasya tad aparyavasānam*. Viśvanātha follows Vardhamāna (see *Nyāyasiddhānta-Kārikāvalī* *Muktāvalī* pp. 312—313).
2. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 15: *svarūpasatyeṽnvañyabuddhāv upēyujyate, na tu jñātā pramāṇābhāvāt*.

From another consideration a *śābdabodha* can be sharply distinguished from inference. Nyāya holds that the subject (*pakṣa*) of an inference must always be limited by some property, which is the limiter of subjectness (*pakṣatāvachchedaka*).¹ The convention is this : When we say 'The mountain possesses fire because of smoke', we consider 'mountain' as the subject of the inference. It is the subjunct (*viśeṣya*) of inferential cognition. The Nyāya asserts, the subjuncthood (*viśeṣyatā*), a relational abstract residing in the subjunct (*viśeṣya*) must always be necessarily limited by some property. The reason for this convention seems to be as follows : We do not express the inference as 'Something possesses fire, because something possesses smoke'. The person, who infers, does not leave the subject ambiguous, but points to a subject that has a definite character and says 'The mountain possesses fire etc.' To be precise, before we ascribe 'y' to 'x' we must know what 'x' is. Likewise in the above example, it is a particular mountain in which the inferable property, 'fire', is sought to be proved.

Adhering to the above principle let us see if we can reasonably consider the cognition of the following sentence meaning as a case of inference : *ghatād anyah* ('Something different from a pot'). If this sentence meaning is derived through inference and not from word (*śabda*), then the inferable property should be the 'difference' (*bheda*). And that to which the 'difference' is ascribed is an indefinite thing expressed by the word 'something'. An indefinite thing has been made the subject of the inference. But we have seen above that an indefinite thing, i.e., a thing that does not have a definite character, cannot be the subject of an inference. Suppose we say that the subject of the inference is specified as 'that which is possessed of difference' in that case the 'subject' becomes a definite thing. But this cannot solve the problem, for if 'that which possesses the difference' becomes the subject of the inference then the delimiting property of the subjectness (*pakṣatāvachchedaka*) becomes the 'difference (from a pot)' by which 'that' is qualified. But what we are trying to infer is also *that* 'difference (from a pot)'.

1. Kṛṣṇakānta on *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 19: *nirdharmitāvachchedakakānumiter anabhyupagamāt*.

Then it becomes a *petitio principii*. In other words, what we are trying to infer is included in the description of the subject (*pakṣa*). Thus Nyāya concludes that we cannot derive the meaning of such a sentence as *ghaṭād anyah* following the process of inference.¹

Another reason why Nyāya claims that the understanding of the meaning of a sentence is a different one from that we get from inference or preception, is as follows : When causal conditions (*sāmagrī*) leading to two types of cognition with regard to the same object, perception and inference, are present, perception, and not inference, takes place. When fire is present in my visual field, I do not infer it from smoke, but preceive it directly. Similarly, when causal conditions leading to two types of cognition, perception and verbal knowledge, with regard to the same object are present, perception overrides verbal knowledge. In the same way, when there are conditions for the possibility of two cognitions, verbal knowledge and inference, with regard to the same object, verbal knowledge overrides inference. In other words, when I am trying to infer whether there is fire on the mountain, if I hear the sentence 'the mountain is fiery', I do not have to infer any further. This mutual exclusion shows that verbal cognition is a distinct type of knowledge from perception and inference.²

We may refer to another argument by which the Nyāya proves *śābdabodha* as a type of cognition different from perception and inference. A type of knowledge is introspected as that type of knowledge. For example : When I perceive or infer I have also the introspection that I have perceived or inferred. In the case of our understanding of sentence meaning, the Nyāya asserts, we have an introspection of verbal cognition, which is distinct from perception and inference. In other words, the character of introspection expressed, e.g., in the

1. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 19: *pakṣavidhayānyatvasya bhāne 'pyanyatvaparakāreṇānyasya tatrābhānāt*. Rāmabhadra on *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* p. 19: *viśeṣyatvenaivānyatvasya tatra bhānād*.

2. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 10: *śabdadhīyaḥ pratyakṣatvābhyupagame pratyakṣādīsāmānyam prati śabdasāmagryāḥ pratibandhakatvasambhavāt*.

Sanskrit expression *śābdayami*, establishes that the cognition is a verbal one, neither preceptual nor inferential.¹

In fine, I may draw attention to some salient features of *śābdabodha*. Unlike perception it is a mediate knowledge like inference etc. But in Nyāya the definition of inference has been formulated in such a way that it excludes *śābdabodha*. Inference is a cognition generated through the mediacy of the knowledge of pervasion (*vyāpti*), while *śābdabodha* is through the cognition of the constituent words in a sentence. Although in both cases, the memory-cognition—in inference memory-cognition of pervasion and in *śābdabodha* that of the word meanings—plays an important part.

Another important feature is : Usually whenever we hear a new sentence we can understand its meaning through semantic competency, expectancy etc. The meanings of individual words may be known to us before, but their syntactic relation is what is given by the new sentence. This relation, which would be the 'mark' if it were an inference, is not given to us before. In the case of inference the relation between the inferential 'mark' (*hetu*) and the inferable property (*sādhya*) must be known to us beforehand. This differentiates *śābdabodha* from inference.

1. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśika*, p. 17: *astitvena gām anuminomītyāder anuvya-vasāyasya tatrāsattvāt, pratyuta gaur astītivākyād astitvena gauḥ śruto na tvanumīta ityanubhavāt.*

CHAPTER TEN

ON INJUNCTIVE SENTENCES

The Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas are the greatest exponents of Indian Semantic theories. Mīmāṃsā prescribes the mode to be adopted for the clear understanding of the meaning of a word or a sentence. Being primarily concerned with the Vedic rites, the Mīmāṃsā discusses at length the principles to be adhered to in interpreting a Vedic injunction, positive or negative. The Navyanyāya has paid much attention to the analysis of sentence, particularly the injunctive statements. To him, an injunction (*vidhi*) denotes that the means adopted should lead to the desired goal, should not lead to any evil consequence and should be practical. There are three types of acts : regular or obligatory (*nitya*), conditional (*naimittika*) and optional (*kāmya*). While the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka thinks that injunction leads us to all these three types of action, the Prābhākara, on the other hand, opines that *vidhi* tends us to the first two types of acts. We are induced to the third type of act for accruing some worldly good—an act to which we take to not by the authority of any injunction.

The concept of *vidhi* originated in the Mīmāṃsā circle, who were primarily engaged in interpreting the injunctions relating to sacrifices. To the Mīmāṃsaka every part of the Vedic text has a reference to certain acts. These texts have been classified under following heads : *Vidhi* (injunction), *mantras* (hymns) *nāmadheya* (names) *niṣedha* (prohibition) and *arthavāda* (explanatory passages). All these help the individual to action. *Vidhi* impels one to action, *mantras* help the sacrificer in determining different matters relating to the performance of the sacrifice, *nāmadheya* indicates the result obtained in a sacrifice, and *niṣedha*, a *vidhi* in disguise, is a negative injunction purported to dissuade a person from doing something; *arthavāda* sentences aim at inducing to or dissuading a person from

certain act, either through praising things enjoined (*praśaṁsā*) or through ensuring things prohibited (*nindā*). *Parakṛti* (description of the acts of others) and *purākalpa* (instances from history) also come under the purview of the sentences known as *arthavādas*.

In this context a note on the term *bhāvanā* so often used in Mīmāṃsā may be in point. It literally means that which conduces to the production (*bhavana*) of certain thing, i.e., production of human impulse in the case under review. *Vidhi* leads to the emergence of two kinds of energy or impulse: *Śābdī* (verbal) and *ārtihī* (actual). *Śābdī bhāvanā* is an inherent attribute of the inspirer and is of the nature of his intention. It is conveyed by the imperative mood *liṅ* added to the root, e.g., in the following sentence, 'One desirous of heaven should perform *aśvamedha* sacrifice' Such injunctive text ensures incitement in the doer of action. Thus, verbal energy is a peculiar transcendental function which originates in the inspirer leading to the imperative character of an injunctive sentence. Actual energy, on the other hand, is the operation pertaining to the performer of the sacrifice leading to the emergence of the result. But the aspect of incitement is common to both.

In Pūrvamīmāṃsā *vidhi* is traditionally defined as 'Vedic injunctive sentence referring to certain object not known by other means (than the Vedas)'. For example: 'Those who desire to go to heaven should perform *agnihotra* sacrifice'. Efficacy of this sentence cannot be judged by any means, i.e., perception, etc., other than the Vedic authority. Thus, this sentence is technically a *vidhi*. It is worthwhile to take note of the four main types of *vidhi*: *utpatti-vidhi*, *vinīyoga-vidhi*, *adhikāra-vidhi*, and *prayoga-vidhi*. The first is illustrated by such statement as: 'One should perform *agnihotra* sacrifice'. This indicates simply that *agnihotra* sacrifice is worth-performing, which has no reference to the result to be obtained through the performance of such sacrifice. *Vinīyoga-vidhi* refers to the objects having direct relation with the sacrifice as such. It indicates the bearing which a subsidiary factor (*aṅga*) has on the main act, e.g. 'One should make oblation with yoghurt' (*dadhna juhuyāt*), where yoghurt has been considered as a part and parcel of the

main act of sacrifice. This is also known as *aṅga-vidhi* (subsidiary injunction) since it does not itself produce the chief result, while the first is a *pradhāna-vidhi* (primary injunction) having direct bearing on the attainment of the result. *Adhikāra-vidhi* has a reference to the result which the performer is quite competent to achieve. e.g., 'One desirous of heaven should perform *agnihotra* sacrifice'. *Prayoga-vidhi* is an entirety of all such injunctive sentences, indicating primary and subsidiary injunctions taken together.

The Mīmāṃsā also gives an alternative division of injunctive sentences : *apūrva V.*, *niyama V.* and *parisaṁkhyā V.* *Apūrva V.* is another name for *utpatti V.* i.e., veracity of the result of which is not ascertainable by any other means than the Vedic injunctive sentence in question. The Mīmāṃsā formula of *niyama-vidhi* (injunction of restriction) also comes under *vinīyoga-vidhi*. Consider the statement : 'One should thrash barley'. Now, barley should be unhusked for preparation of sacrificial cake. This unhusking can be done in any way, say, for example, by our nails or by thrashing. It is upto the intention of the doer which process he would take to. But the above Mīmāṃsā formula enjoins that the performer is not free to choose his course of action, since restriction is put on it by the above injunction, i.e. to say, he has to have recourse to thrashing and not to any other method, because thrashing produces a certain 'unseen force' (*apūrva*) leading to the ultimate goal. Non-adherence to the particular process prescribed will lead to different sort of unseen force, which will not cause the principal result (i.e. heaven). If unhusking were effected by any other means than what is prescribed, the latter (i.e. thrashing) would not have occurred. The above statement precludes the possibility of non-occurrence (of husking) and thereby prescribes husking and excludes the operation of the other means. Thus *niyama* also indirectly implies prohibition of the operation of any other act not prescribed (*ayoga-vyavaccheda*), the occurrence of which was a likelihood had not the injunction been enjoined. *Parisaṁkhyā-vidhi* primarily denotes prohibition. Consider the statement : 'Five out of five-nailed animals are to be eaten'. This does not enjoin eating of the five types of animals out of five-nailed animals, but simply

prohibits eating of the flesh of animals which are not five-nailed, as well as of five-nailed animals other than the five allowed. Thus it is a pure and simple prohibitory sentence, excluding the likelihood of any other act (*anyayogavyavaccheda*). If we at all desire to eat flesh of animals, we must choose among what is prescribed. Thus, *vidhi* compels us to act, *niyama* restricts us to a particular alternative precluding the other, but both these two types prescribe something positive. *Parisamkhyā*, on the other hand, is simply permissive, it does not make anything obligatory on us, its purpose is simply to forbid.

It may be well to consider the nature of negative sentences, which are prohibitory in nature (*niśedha*). Consider the statement : 'One should not eat *Kalañjā*' (*na Kalañjam bhakṣayet*). This sentence turns a man away (*niṣṛtti*) from eating such prohibited things as *kalañja*. In the ascertainment of the exact import of such prohibitory sentence one is faced with a pertinent question : Should the negative particle be construed with the verbal root (*dhātu*) or with the verbal suffix *liñ* ? The Mīmāṃsā replies that not the root-element but the *liñ*-suffix should be construed with the negative particle. The reason thereof suggested by the Mīmāṃsā is as follows : *bhakṣayet* means one should eat with a view to attain certain end (*bhakṣaṇena iṣṭam bhāvayet*). Thus the *sādhya* is the desired end, for which the act of eating is a means and hence the latter becomes subordinate (*upasarjana*) to the desired goal. The meaning of the verbal root being subordinate something else cannot be construed with another, in the same way as *rājan* cannot be construed with *ānaya* in the sentence '*rāja-puruṣam ānaya*'. The principle followed here can be put as: when x is subordinate to y it is naturally connected with it, and cannot be further construed with z, even if z is proximate to it (*na hi anyopasarjanatvena upasthitam anyatrānveti*).

The injunctive sentences have always a predicative mood (*liñ*) added to the verbal root. The Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya differ in assigning meaning to verbal suffix *liñ*. Udayana, the Naiyāyika, claims the verbal suffix in an injunctive sentence to mean the intension of a worthy person. The verbal suffix produces the judgement on the basis of which one infers that the

act, if done, will do good to him, because it is the intention of the worthy person. Now, whoever understands the meaning of an injunctive sentence is prompted to perform certain act, if he is convinced that the (a) action will bring him certain good and (b) the action can be performed by him.

Traditionally the use of a predicative mood (*liṅ*) in Vedic injunction comprises the following specific questions : (a) Does *liṅ* signify some property belonging to the doer, or (b) does it refer to some property of the goal to be achieved, or (c) does it simply point out that the action will bring the performer good (*iṣṭasādhanaṃ*). These points have been discussed and criticised by Udayana in his attempt to prove the existence of Īśvara (*vide Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, chap. V). To Udayana, intention of worthy person (*āpta*) is the meaning of the injunctive mood and the person whose intention is the meaning of *liṅ* suffix in Vedic injunction is Īśvara.

A *liṅ* suffix cannot mean property of the doer for the following reason : The property of the doer may be either his knowledge, desire or volitional effort, or any physical action of the doer who acts according to Vedic injunction. The last alternative is untenable in view of the fact that there are injunctions which do not enjoin any physical act on the part of the doer, such as 'Know thyself'. It cannot be maintained that it is the volitional effort (*prayatna*) and not the physical act which is meant by the *liṅ* suffix, because the Mīmāṃsakas themselves admit that effort is the meaning of every verbal suffix, not of the *liṅ* suffix alone. Nor can *liṅ* suffix mean the desire of the doer, because that will lead to circularity. Every desire is caused by the knowledge of injunction (which is the form of a judgement) and if this knowledge is of the nature of desire it will be caused by desire itself, since this knowledge is nothing but the introspective knowledge of desire and desire is the object of such introspection.

It may be said that *liṅ* causes judgement about desire and not the desire itself and hence it would not involve circularity. But this reply would not serve any purpose, since it is the desire as such and not the judgement about desire, which causes action. The *liṅ* cannot cause desire as such (*svarūpasat*), for desire can

be caused only by judgement. It is admitted on all hands that desire to act can be produced only by the judgement that the act will bring the doer some good. It is never produced by any injunction.

An injunction cannot also mean the property of the object to be attained. For example, if the sentence 'one desirous of heaven should perform sacrifice' means the property of heaven, viz, 'it can be attained' (*kārya*), then this knowledge that 'heaven can be attained' might be regarded as motive to all other actions which the doer would like to perform. The old Nyāya and Maṇḍana Miśra hold that the meaning of *liṅ* is the property of the action that it will do me good. But that is also not tenable, since injunction is the cause of *iṣṭasādhana*tā and if injunction itself is *iṣṭasādhana*tā it would mean that the cause and effect are the same. Hence Udayana concludes that the meaning of 'should' is the desire of the worthy and variable person (*āptābhiprāya*).

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